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## REINTERPELLATION AND REIMITATION OF CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY OF SALAFI THROUGH THE MEDIATIZATION OF RELIGION ON INSTAGRAM RODJATV

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### ABSTRACT

*The Salafist community, which is marginalized from mainstream media in Indonesia, represents the ideology of Salafus Salih through the mediatization of religion. Salafists originally preached traditionally but later utilized radio and television and then websites and social media. This ideological representation through the mediatization of religion increases the number of followers so that they can reproduce social formations to maintain the status quo. For this reason, this study aims to reveal how Salafists represent the conservative ideology of Salafus Salih through the mediatization of religion on Rodjatv's Instagram. Using a critical paradigm and mediatization of religion theory with virtual ethnographic methods, this study explains how the conservative ideology of Salafus Shalih in the mediatization of religion through three media metaphors, media as a channel, language, and environment, is instilled by the Salafi group to its followers. The results revealed that the Salafi da'wah content in Rodja's media interpellated the new Salafis and imitated the religious way of Salafus Salih while creating a large number of*

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*communities or congregations. The new Salafi followers then interpellated (re-interpellation) and imitated (reimitation) to the next follower. The series of re-interpellations and limitations ultimately constituted the Salafi da'wah and the ideological congregation of Salafus Salih*

**KEYWORDS**

Representation of Ideology, Salafi, Conservative, Mediatization of Religion, Instagram, Rodjatv



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## INTRODUCTION

Before the change in the political system from authoritarianism to a democratic system, religious content in the mass media, especially television in Indonesia, was dominated by mainstream religious groups. During the New Order era, the message (Tapsell, 2017)(communication) was one of homogeneity and 'national unity, and the television medium was the most likely for the ideals sponsored by a controlled strategy. From a political economy perspective, the mass media, especially television in Indonesia, are under the domination of the capitalist system. Television in Indonesia is not an independent and autonomous power but rather an ideological tool used by capital holders. The media are instruments of the capitalist class, and the products they produce are a transmission system for capitalist interests and ideologies (Armando, 2016). Practically speaking, if religious preachers want to appear on mainstream television, they must adapt to the political-economic system adopted by the media. On the other hand, non-adaptive groups and not part of mainstream religious groups are always marginalized in the media communication system. For example, Salafists from Cileungsi, Bogor, West Java belong to groups not accommodated by mainstream media, especially television in Indonesia.

However, since the reformation era, which impacted the democratization of communication, the political system in Indonesia has provided opportunities for marginalized religious groups to carry out media presence and digital presence. Media presence and digital presence as a form of communication mediated by technology is communication using media, which has the same meaning as mediatization. The concept of mediatization means that the media develop into independent institutions in society, and as a result, other institutions become increasingly dependent on the media and must accommodate the logic of the media to communicate with other institutions and society. Meanwhile, the mediatization of religion means how the media influence the imagination, practice, and religious authority through three media metaphors: media as a channel, language, and environment (Hjarvard, 2013).

In 2005, Salafists from Cileungsi, Bogor, West Java, Indonesia, a school of conservatism and Islamic puritans, mediated religion through Radio Rodja and Rodja TV and continued through social media. Salafis rely on the teachings of Salafus Salih, which means "pious predecessors" (Minarno et al., 2020), namely the first three generations of Islam after the Prophet Muhammad. They are also referred to as Salafiyyun (plural of Salafist), i.e., everyone above the manhaj (method, ways) of the Salaf in creed, sharia, morality, and da'wah. The Salafiyyun who follow the Salaf manhaj identifies themselves as Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. Salaf also means "something or previous person".

The meaning of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah as meant by Salafist is different from the terminology among Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). For NU, one of the characteristics of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah is washatiah, which means "middle" or moderate. The central character of NU is in all aspects of its teachings, recognizing Sufism and basing Islamic teachings on the Qur'an and As-Sunnah as the main sources, aside from secondary sources such as ijma' and qiyas (<https://www.nu.or.id/>). In contrast to NU, Salafists reject Sufism

and the qiyas method. The teachings of Sufism and its followers (Sufis) are considered *ahlul bid'ah* deemed heretical and misleading. Salafists themselves are divided into pure Salafis (focusing on the teachings of faith and fiqh) and jihadi Salafis (moving, like the Muslim Brotherhood). In addition, pure Salafists are increasingly being accepted by Indonesian people, especially young people.

Although not appropriate, Salafists are often stigmatized as sowing the seeds of fundamental radicals who avoid the *da'wah* of *hizbiyyah* or groups or organizations (Chozin, 2013). However, it is undeniable that this Salafi from Cileungsi is categorized as a conservative follower who tends to resist change and maintain the status quo – an established condition. Religious conservatism adheres strictly to the scriptures or to the teachings, orthodoxy, and traditions considered the most correct and rejects understanding, interpretation, and renewal of religious thought and practice based on certain modern developments (Azra, 2019). Conservatism also means "the desire to preserve, reflected in the resistance to, or at least suspicion of, change." The will to resist change is a recurring theme in conservatism (Heywood, 2012). In addition, the conservative form of religion can be traced from indicators such as "rejecting modernism, liberalism, or progressivism in religious teachings, making hadith as the main reference that must be literally duplicated and obeying the doctrine and social order inherited by the Prophet without contextualization". The literal duplication of the Prophet's hadith and adhering to the doctrines and social order inherited from the Prophet without contextualization are the main characteristics of Salafists from Cileungsi, Bogor.

Salafists are also often associated with fundamentalism movements. Those classified as fundamentalists describe themselves as 'traditionalists', 'conservatives', 'evangelicals', 'revivalists' and others. However, even though the fundamentalism movement rejects the products of modernity or Western products, it is limited to a social understanding, not a technological aspect. In the field of technology, they do not really question it as long as it does not conflict with their basic creed or belief (Sumaedi et al., 2011). Before utilizing modern communication technology, Salafists and other *da'wah* groups were still in the category of Islamic groups that preached traditionally, emphasizing face-to-face communication activities only (Bakti, 2018)

Conserving religious teachings fundamentally is one of the reasons that the Cileungsi Salafis are absent from the mainstream Indonesian media. Salafis duplicate hadith (rules quoted from the Prophet) literally and adhere to the doctrines and social order inherited by the Prophet without contextualization, as taught by Salafus Salih (the first three generations after the life of the Prophet). Practically speaking, Salafists reject the rules of the game set by mainstream media managers, especially television, when they are presenters (talents), including (1) trimming their beards, (2) not wearing Middle Eastern clothes (cloaks), (3) conveying lecture material with a touch of entertainment, such as jokes, and (4) refusing to have make-up (Wiryoutomo, 2009)

Since the 1990s, the Salafi community from Cileungsi has made existential ideological representations. Representation of ideology means the redrawing of ideology, where ideology as a system of representation (in the form of images, myths, ideas, or concepts, depending on the context) is supported by the existence and historical role in a particular society (Althusser, 2005). In ideological representation, interpellation occurs (summoning, recruiting, changing) and necessitates an imitation process known as the mirror phase (Kellner & Durham, 2006)

Moreover, the early stage of Salafus Salih's conservative ideological representation movement used conventional *da'wah* strategies, namely interpersonal and group communication patterns. Interpersonal communication emphasizes direct face-to-face interaction, while group communication emphasizes the process of exchanging messages



aimed at influencing each other (Sobur, 2014). It is what the contemporary Indonesian Salafi figure, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, has done since the 1990s, and then continued by one of his brothers-in-law, Badru Salam, in 2001. Jawas instilled a conservative ideology through the pulpit of the mosque and house-to-house recitations.

Badru Salam, a second-generation Salafi from Cileungsi, combined the da'wah (Islamic communication) model with a special training method through recitations aimed at specific communities, known as *daurah*, i.e., a way for Muslims to increase their religious knowledge and transmit religious knowledge to others. The representation of ideology through interpersonal and group communication patterns by Yazid and Badru Salam could only reach audiences on a local scale. Despite successfully recruiting or converting several congregations (groups of worshippers), the number and scope of the area were still limited. The interpersonal and group communication used by Salafists from Cileungsi in the early stages also often led to misunderstandings. The community accused them of being a deviant sect, advocating violence using religion or radicalism and terrorism, and received threats that the masses would burn their place of worship (Hasanuddin Interview #1, August 27, 2021). However, thanks to the mediatization of religion through *Rodja*, *Rodja TV*, and later websites and social media, the representation of Salafus Salih's ideology can be accepted by local communities in the Cileungsi area. Through the mediatization of religion, the Salafism movement expanded from a geographical aspect and enlarged from a demographic aspect.

In 2005, the initial stage of the mediatization of religion was carried out by establishing *Radio Rodja*. With a capital of only IDR 3,500,000 (Hasanuddin Interview, August 27, 2021), Cileungsi Salafists spread Salafism to the public within a 2.5-kilometer radius. However, in 2007, with a donation from a follower, Salafi Cileungsi acquired a private radio owner of the 576 AM frequency so that *Radio Rodja* broadcasts regionally, covering Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. *Radio Rodja* then built a networked broadcast system in various cities in Indonesia and established itself as a pioneer of Islamic preaching radio, pioneering the Salaf line, which triggered tensions, especially between traditionalist Muslim groups and Salafists themselves (Wahid & Makruf, 2017). Even starting in 2011, through the *Rodja TV* Satellite platform, Salafists have carried out functions in the development of civil society while proving themselves as modern da'wah actors.



**Figure 1**

**Rodja's Salafi media figure, Ustaz Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, in one of his lecture series entitled "Noble with Manhaj Salaf." Uploaded on Youtube Rodja TV on October 9, 2015 (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dghYmiz34I&t=4005s>).**

With success on radio, Salafi Cileungsi began broadcasting Salafism's da'wah through Internet-based video streaming (2009) and the *Rodja TV* Satellite platform (2011). Salafi emancipatory actions are followed by a digital presence through social media,

starting with Twitter to Instagram and Telegram. Salafis can also reach an audience of young age groups, the majority users of Instagram. The reality is that, from around 91 million Instagram users in Indonesia in 2021, 33.9 million users are aged 18-24 years (<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/>, 15/11/2021). Therefore, the mediatization of religion on social media has made the Salafism movement grow, and the number of followers has increased. In October 2020, Rodjatv's Instagram followers were 435,000, then increased to 492,000 in April 2022 (<https://www.instagram.com/rodjatv/>, 30/04/2022).



Figure 2

**Rodjatv's account on Instagram shows the Salafi figure, Badru Salam, about the "Prohibition of Using Stickers on WhatsApp" uploaded on October 5, 2022. (<https://www.instagram.com/p/CF8goCvHRx9/>).**

Based on the above phenomenon, this study aims to reveal how the conservative ideology of *Salafus Salih* is represented through the mediatization of religion on *Rodjatv's* Instagram social media. To what extent do Salafists carry out the mediatization of religious activities through social media on *Rodjatv's* Instagram account?

## RESEARCH METHOD

This study used a critical paradigm, namely the knowledge paradigm that "always suspects an interest behind something," with practical implications for social change by uncovering the real structure behind the illusions, and false needs, which are revealed by the material world, to form social awareness to improve and change their living conditions (Cano et al., 2018). In the critical paradigm, a more appropriate label is "ideologically oriented inquiry." The task of the critical paradigm in research is to lift the oppressed into the vortex of "true conscience" and act to change the world, in parallel with predicting and controlling it all at once.

This research employed a qualitative approach, starting with assumptions and an interpretive/theoretical framework that formed or influenced the study of research problems related to the meanings imposed by individuals or groups on a social or human problem. Qualitative research is a located activity consisting of a series of naturalistic material interpretation practices, making the world visible. These practices transform the world into a series of representations, comprising field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and personal notes.

This research method is virtual ethnography, which is an additional note to see the phonemes that occur in computer-mediated communication. In simple terms, virtual ethnography means "ethnographic methods used to reveal the reality, both visible and invisible, of computer-mediated communication among community entities [members] on the internet". Hine (2000) emphasizes 10 principles of Virtual Ethnography, three principles used in this study include virtual ethnographers being present in an environment that is continuously researched, interactive media such as the Internet can be understood as



culture and cultural artifacts, and researchers can consider ethnography mediated interactions as a form of cellular (communication) rather than a multi-location (communication) nature.

Virtual ethnographers in addition to having to be present in an environment that is continuously researched, understand or be aware of the characteristics of cultural and cultural artifacts, and be actively involved (Hine, 2000), also require extensive observation of the group, often through participant observation, 'immersing oneself' in people's daily lives, observing, interviewing the participants in the group. Data collection methods in virtual ethnographic research are carried out in at least three ways, namely first, observation of participants. The second method is interviews and capturing activities, as well as archival and historical research. There are three important steps taken by virtual ethnographers: (1) sorting out cultural and cultural artifacts that are the center of research, (2) ensure the validity of informants, and (3) build a communication model with informants.

In addition to having to be present in an environment continuously researched, understand or be aware of the characteristics of cultural and cultural artifacts, and be actively involved, virtual ethnographers also require extensive observation of the group, which is often through participant observation, "immersing themselves" in people's daily lives, observing and interviewing the participants in the group. Data collection methods in virtual ethnographic research were carried out in at least three ways: participant observation, interviews and photographing (capturing) activities, and archival and historical research. Meanwhile, three important steps were taken by virtual ethnographers: (1) sorting out cultural and cultural artifacts that are the center of research, (2) ensuring the validity of informants, and (3) building a communication model with informants.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

The Cileungsi Salafists identify themselves as purifiers of Islamic da'wah groups, namely returning all the main teachings and practices of worship and muamalah, as inherited by the Prophet and passed on by the first three generations after the Prophet through the jargon "Da'wah Tauhid (oneness of God) and Sunnah (rules quoted from the Prophet Muhammad)." It became a jargon and a representation of contemporary Salafus Salih.

### **Call to Strengthen Faith**

The main characteristics of the preaching of monotheism and sunnah by Salafi Cileungsi are calls to strengthen Aqedah (belief, faith), purify Islam based on the arguments of the Qur'an and sunnah, and eradicate shirk (associating partners with God), such as the practice of shamanism, worshiping other than God, and prohibition of worship around graves. These characteristics of monotheism and sunnah da'wah are the main indicators and identities for followers in worship and muamalah practices. The followers of Salafism will be seen from the way of worship, such as prayer and in their physical appearance. The da'wah of monotheism and sunnah carried out by Salafists from Cileungsi was also carried out through interpersonal and group communication and then continued through radio, television, and websites to Rodjatv's Instagram social media. It managed to gain a significant number of followers.

### **Imitate the Prophet and the Salih Salafus Completely**

The entire implementation of the main worship (mahdlah), especially prayer, fasting, zakat, hajj, and other worship as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and the Salafus Salih, must be carried out as it is, according to the arguments contained in the Qur'an and hadith. On the other hand, for those who deviate from what was exemplified by the Prophet





Muhammad and the Salafus Salih, it is categorized as an act of bid'ah (a new thing in religion or something made up after the death of the Prophet). In worship and muamalah, if individuals do not imitate the Prophet, they are considered bid'ah and threatened with going to hell. This literal imitation is also done by virtual followers through the media. Through these two stages, da'wah for monotheism (oneness of God) and sunnah (rules quoted from the Prophet) are quite effective in generating followers in large numbers. These followers then invite others to become the next followers and imitate (ittiba') literally the way of worship and life of the Prophet and his Companions.

In addition to the form of worship practices, the act of imitating the Prophet and Salafus Salih is also shown by the physical appearance of the followers. In everyday life, men wear robes over the ankles or syirwal pants. Men are also prohibited from trimming beards. Meanwhile, women are concerned with gamish clothes with long headscarves that reach below the hips.

### **Media for the Study of the Qur'an and Hadith (Words, Behavior, and Tirkah of the Prophet)**

Recognizing the power of the media in influencing religious imagination, practice, and authority, the Salafi community of Cileungsi, spearheaded by Badru Salam, pioneered the establishment of Radio Rodja in 2005. Rodja etymologically comes from Arabic, which means "to hope." Rodja is also an acronym for "Radio Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah."

### **Reading and Interpreting the Qur'an and Hadith**

Radio Rodja and Rodja TV every day around the clock only broadcast Salaf lectures and recitations, reading the Qur'an through murottal and excerpts of the Prophet's hadith. From the audio and audio-visual media, audio-visual and written narration was then sampled to be uploaded on Rodjatv's Instagram, with various philanthropic content.

By only broadcasting lectures or studies, murottals (recorded readings of the Qur'an), and excerpts of hadith and fatwas of Salaf scholars, Rodja media expand the reach of Salafism da'wah and corrects misunderstandings (misperceptions) that Salafists are heretical, radical sects, and even terrorists, to sharia Salafists who struggle to enforce Islamic law.

### **Salafism Community Language**

The communication pattern between Salafi clerics and their audiences uses dictions in Arabic, commonly used in interpersonal communication between them. Afwan's diction means "sorry" or "thank you." The diction Syukron jazakumullahu khairan means "thank you, may Allah reward you with kindness." Dictions Ana (me), Antum (you), or referring to "someone or male friend" as Ikhwan, while "someone or female friend" is called Ukhti. The congregation obtained the Arabic diction and idioms from the ustaz when attending the recitation, which eventually became a habituation in daily conversation (Hasanuddin Interview, October 22, 2021). In addition to learning Arabic as a Muslim obligation, Arabic diction is a group identification, which is the way the media connects messages and builds communicative relationships between the sender of the message (communicator), content, and recipient of the message (audience).

### **Sense of Togetherness and Mutual Help (Ta'awun)**

Media Rodja can create a community environment with the principle of mutual help (ta'awun). Rodja's media operational costs were obtained from donations from Rodjatv's Instagram followers, which amounted to 393,000 as of May 5, 2022. Rodja's media is also developing with a network system, including the presence of Rodja Lesmana in Bogor City, Radio Rodja Majalengka, and Radio Rodja Bandung, all in West Java, and thanks to donations from followers. Specifically, Rodja's media operational donations reached IDR 300 million every month, obtained from around 2,000 donors, called muhsinin, which

means good people or benefactors (Hasanuddin Interview, August 27, 2021). Donations packaged through the concept of *ta'awun* (mutual help) were not only to finance Rodja's media operations but also had a positive impact on the welfare of the community around the Al-Barkah Mosque, the location of Rodja's headquarters. In addition to food and drink alms, poor people experiencing economic difficulties also regularly received rice and money assistance from Rodja's followers. The principle of *ta'awun* is also a *da'wah* strategy and invites the surrounding community to at least not hate Salafis. The concept of *ta'awun* is also used to pay off debts for residents in debt but could not pay. When Eid arrived, people who hated Salafis were given gifts so that from what they originally hated, they turned into sympathy. The circulation of compensation money for the poor or affected by disasters could reach IDR 50 billion per year.



**Figure 2**

**The atmosphere of the queue of followers for a free lunch next to the Al-Barkah Mosque after every Friday prayer as part of *ta'awun*. Salafi followers wear robes or trousers above the ankles (*syirwal*).  
Photo Source: Personal Collection**

### **New Salafi Mass Reinterpellation and Reimitation**

*Da'wah* of monotheism (oneness of God) by eradicating the practice of *shirk* (associating partners with God) and *sunnah* (rules quoted from the Prophet) has been going on since the 1990s through interpersonal and group communication modes in Al-Barkah Mosque and group recitations from house to house. The conventional *da'wah* method was carried out by inviting the object of *da'wah* of the residents of Kampung Tengah, Cileungsi, to unite God (*tawhid*) and a pure way of religion derived from the arguments of the Qur'an and *hadith* (words, behavior, and *tirkah* of the Prophet) as a manifestation of Islamic purification. In addition, Salafism *da'wah* purifies Islam by calling on people to imitate the way of the religion of the Prophet Muhammad, as taught by the three early generations of Islam after the death of the Prophet (Salafus Salih). Salafists literally practice the Salafus Salih way of life and religion, including keeping a beard, wearing robes, and *syirwal* pants. In this regard, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, the first generation of Salafi Cileungsi, has successfully done interpellation (summoned, changed, recruited) some of the Kampung Tengah Cileungsi people to become Salafis, both in terms of ideas and actions.

However, the initial phase of interpellation and imitation could only produce recruits and imitations on a small scale. Yazid then recruited his brother-in-law, Badru Salam, through educational methods. Badru Salam was sent to school in Salafi training centers, namely the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences (LIPIA) Jakarta and the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. After returning from Saudi Arabia in 2001, Badru Salam had literally done re-imitation and re-interpellation of the younger generation around Kampung Tengah, Cileungsi, through the *daurah* method. It is an activity to increase religious knowledge and distribute religious knowledge to others while becoming an *ustaz*

(religious teacher) at the Al-Barkah Mosque. Badru Salam's re-interpellations and re-imitations are more mass through the mediatization of religion, starting from establishing Radio Rodja (2005) to being present on Instagram (2014-2020). The number of followers on Rodjatv's Instagram has now reached 492,000 (<https://www.instagram.com/01/05/2022>).

In addition, Salafi followers on Rodjatv Instagram understand religion, monotheism, and the Sunnah of the Prophet better by imitating Salafists from ustadz on Rodjatv, as was the case with the followers Dariskan Irananda and Fatur as-Salafi from West Kalimantan and Annisa Nurul Izati from West Sumatra. The new Salafi did a literal re-imitation of the teachings of Salafus Salih and did a re-interpellation of Salafism, with a minimum of the family and the surrounding environment, as Andy Zuhair from Maros, South Sulawesi.

### **Representation of Ideology Challenging Pluralism**

Before mediatizing religion, Salafists were accused of being a group that spread deviant sects, hard (radical) sects, and part of terrorists, so the Al-Barkah Mosque was about to be burned by the masses. However, through the mediatization of religion, starting with radio, television, websites, and social media, especially Instagram, the public accepted Salafi da'wah and even brought in material assistance. However, the movement's effectiveness in instilling the conservative ideology of Salafus Salih is determined not only by the mediatization of religion through Rodjatv but also by a change in strategy. It includes accommodation for the intermediary system (tawassul) and blessings (tabarruk) in worship, conducting studies at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta as a place of study to gather public justifications, and broadcasting the study on Rodja TV to create an image of itself as a leading Islamic media (Bakti, 2018). Even though Rodja's Salafi media changed his da'wah strategy to be more accommodating to the locality aspect, the reality revealed that the Salafi community remains marginalized in the media communication system in Indonesia. From the New Order until the Reformation Era, only Trans7, which has no more than 60 minutes, has presented Ustaz Badru Salam, the main Salafi character from Cileungsi (Wirjoutomo, 06/12/2021).

In representing the conservative ideology, Salafi Rodja from Cileungsi, as an adherent and preacher of the Salafus Shalih manhaj, shows monotheism and, on the other hand, rejects the idea of pluralism. Pluralism is defined as creating a relationship between values in a society that are mutually exclusive (Kekes, 1993). By disseminating the teachings of Salafus Salih, Salafi Rodja from Cileungsi always emphasizes that the sole interpreter of the textuality of Islamic teachings is only in one path, called Salafus Salih. Muslims who do not follow the Salafus Salih manhaj is in danger of going to hell, and vice versa, those who follow him become residents of heaven. By becoming a Salafiyah, Muslims are also guaranteed to be safe in the hereafter. As emphasized by Kekes, social reality (religion is no exception) creates a relationship between values that necessarily exist (stand) with each other. This social reality is plural. The attitude of monotheism was also shown by Salafi Rodja from Cileungsi, who did not accommodate his da'wah movement in Islamic mass organizations, such as Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

### **Revision of Ideological Interpellation Theory**

Althusser criticized Marx in terms of the workings of ideology. For Althusser, ideology affects everyone unconsciously (Althusser, 2010). Meanwhile, Marx believes that ideology presents false consciousness (Faiz, 2020). For Salafists, when mediatizing religion in Rodja's media, it is imaginary (unconsciously) carrying out the function or duty of the previous pious generation (Salafus Shalih) to "change, summon, or recruit" the Muslims, who are Rodja's media audience. Subjects who were "changed, called, or recruited" became followers of Salafus Salih who were also in an imaginary state as if



(unconsciously) imitated Salafus Salih so that some of them, apart from being imaginary as representatives of Salafus Salih, were also moved to donate (material). Those who were interpellated and imitated then did re-interpellation and re-imitation.

When discussing ideological representations, namely ideologies which are representations of the imaginary relationship of individuals with their real conditions of existence that require interpellation and mirror (imitation), Althusser did not mention the existence of the reality that interpellation and imitation ultimately result in the reproduction of social formations that keep repeating itself to maintain the status-quo if it is done through the mediatization of religion. In reality, interpellation and imitation through Rodja's media necessitate re-interpellation and re-imitation, manifested in the accumulation of followers, materials (donations), and changes in the way of life and worship of the Salafiyah community circularly taking place. Althusser also never discussed the mode of re-interpellation or re-imitation as praxis for reproducing social formations. Althusser only ensures that human society exudes ideology as an indispensable element and atmosphere for their historical and lifelong respiration.

### **Da'wahis Salafist's Emancipatory Practices**

The mediatization of religion by Salafists through Rodja's media in the early phase consistently disseminated the content of the Qur'an and hadith (words, behaviors, and relics of the Prophet), as a channel of tilawah/recitation (reading the Qur'an with a commitment to practice), through lectures, studies, and murottal (reading the Qur'an according to the correct speech and calmly), and excerpts of the Prophet's hadith through various sections, such as "Islamic Studies" on Radio Rodja, Rodja TV, and on the Rodjatv Instagram feed. By making Rodja's media a "Channel of Islamic Recitation and Study," Salafism's da'wah can reach a wide audience and an existential affirmation for Salafists as da'wahists Salafists, not political or sharia Salafists, who struggle to enforce Islamic law in the Indonesian constitutional system. Before having Rodja, Cileungsi's preaching of Salafism often sparked tension. They were often suspected and accused of being a cult, perpetrators of violence in the name of religion (radicals), terrorist groups, and even the Al-Barkah Mosque being threatened with burning by the masses. Since there was Radio Rodja (and later Rodja TV to Rodjatv Instagram), the public then accepted the preaching of Salafism.

By using the media as a means of da'wah, Salafists have also proven themselves able to get out of marginal conditions in the media communication system in Indonesia. These da'wahis Salafists from Cileungsi previously did not receive accommodation from the mainstream media in Indonesia to essentially defend the teachings of Salafus Salih. As a puritanical da'wah group considered conservative, Salafi Cileungsi is actually able to become an emancipatory group of mainstream da'wahists, competent in using modern communication technology products. Rodjatv's Instagram also gained a large number of followers, superior to Muhammadiyah's Instagram TVMuhammadiyah and Instagram's NU Channel, belonging to Islamic mass organizations, which claim to have the largest members. From the perspective of the Frankfurt school's critical theory of emancipation, the movement of Salafists from Cileungsi, who mediatized religion through Rodja's media, is a form of communicative emancipation, i.e., trying to "free themselves from the shackles of the communication media system," in which by itself, from marginalized conditions, Salafists become empowered (emancipatory).

### **The Dialectic of the Economic Base Versus the Superstructure**

Althusser identifies ideology as something organic as part of every social totality. Human society seems unable to survive without a special formation, namely its system of ideological representation. Human society also issues ideology as an indispensable element and atmosphere for their historical respiration and life. Specifically, regarding this material, ideology has a material existence, and it is also emphasized that ideology does not have a spiritual or ideal existence (ideale or ideelle) but (only) has a material existence (Althusser,

2015). However, in terms of materialism, as the successor of Karl Marx, Althusser criticized Marx himself. If Marx considers that the foundation of social life is the economy as the basis (economic-based) or called economic determinism, while ideology, politics, religion, law, and culture as the implementation of social life, for Althusser, it is an ideology that determines all aspects of human life (Faiz, 2020). For Althusser, also, the theory of economic determinism (economic-based) is an “ambiguous and unbalanced concept” (Althusser, 2005).

In addition, Marx believes a thesis that the economic basis (material) determines all aspects of life. However, Althusser offers the antithesis that ideology is deterministic. In this case, Salafi media Rodja synthesizes that both economic factors and ideological factors can 'go hand in hand' with planting, forming, or changing (transforming) ideology, which appears initially. Salafists' movement of planting, forming, or changing ideology in the community around Kampung Tengah, Cileungsi, which continued to Rodja's media audience, was initially not based on mere economic motives. However, when Salafists mediatize religion, starting from Radio Rodja, Rodja TV, websites, to Rodjatv's Instagram, it cannot be separated from economic or material factors. The mode of including the economic aspect from the perspective of civil society theory was also carried out by other da'wah groups, such as Daarut Tauhid, led by Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) and Majelis Az-Zikra, led by Arifin Ilham. These two da'wah entities carry out business activities among da'wah activities (Bakti, 2006; Bakti, 2006). From another perspective, contemporary Salafis have to adapt their actions amid a media business system that is completely in a capitalistic system. The media in Indonesia are indeed instruments of the capitalist class, and the products they produce are a transmission system for capitalist interests and ideologies (Armando, 2016). In a fully capitalistic society, an individual capitalist enterprise that does not take advantage of its opportunities to generate profits is doomed to extinction (Weber, 1992).

Furthermore, the representation of Salafus Salih's conservative ideology through mediatizing religion on Rodjatv's Instagram account also affirms and adopts the concept of Althusser's ideological state apparatus (ISA). It states that ideology works consensually through institutions, such as religion, education, family, law, political system, trade unions, channels of communication (media), and culture (Althusser, 2010). Affirmation and adoption of Althusser's ISA concept are at the same time dialectic with the concept of Marxist ideology that can only work through a repressive state apparatus (RSA), namely through the government, administration, armed forces, police, courts, and prisons.

## **CONCLUSION**

The movement to instill the Salafus Salih ideology was initiated by Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas through interpersonal and group communication patterns using the media of the mosque pulpit and house-to-house recitation forums. Yazid, who represented himself as an imaginary Salafus Salih, did interpellation (recruiting, changing) from the existing ideology to become Salafist. Then, recruitment was carried out in two ways: 1) dismantling the beliefs and practices of worship and muamalah that were previously hybridized with local traditions or culture, purified by the teachings of monotheism (oneness of God) and imitating all teachings and 2) worship and muamalah practices according to the sunnah (rules cited by from the Prophet Muhammad) taught by the previous three pious generations (as-Salaf as-Sahlih). Yazid then recruited the family of the founder of Al-Barkah, Haji Bakri, by marrying one of his daughters and educating one of his brothers-in-law, Badru Salam. The second generation of Salafi Cileungsi recruited by Yazid, namely Badru Salam with his family and recruits, established the Rodja media as a means of modern da'wah, starting from Radio Rodja, Rodjatv, websites, to social media Rodjatv Instagram.



Through Rodja's media, what is known as the mediatization of religion occurs; namely, the media influences religious imagination, practice, and authority. In the mediatization process in Rodja's media, religion is increasingly classified under media logic in terms of institutional regulations, symbolic content, and individual practices. Salafists continue to represent the ideology of Salafus Salih through content that fully contains messages of preaching monotheism (oneness of God) and sunnah (rules quoted from the Prophet) by making it a "Channel for Recitation of the Qur'an and Islamic Studies." The representation of Salafus Salih's ideology through Rodjatv on Instagram also allows for massive re-recruitment (re-interpellation) of his followers and dissemination of circular imitation (re-imitation) of worship and muamalah practices. All movements instill a conservative ideology through the mediatization of religion by recruiting and totally imitating the worship and muamalah practices of the Prophet, which are literally based on the Qur'an and hadith (words, behavior, and tirkah of the Prophet) and are imaginary, as is the ideology that constitutes the needs of all human beings, which does not work through 'consciousness.'

By adhering to the argument that "all world affairs (worship of ghairu mahdlah, muamalah) are permitted except those that are prohibited," including the permissibility of using communication and information technology, not to mention Jewish products, Salafists competently utilize new media, namely social media Instagram used by young people. Through the Rodjatv account, Salafists have gained a large number of followers, amounting to 493,000 as of May 2, 2022. These young Instagram users have also become targets for the ideological representation of Salafus Salih.

The Salafists have also succeeded in facilitating the communicative mode of their followers in the context of continuous re-interpellation and re-imitation and carrying out "targeted advertising-based capital accumulation on social media" (digital capitalism) in the context of reproducing social formations. The accumulation of capital is in the form of regular donations from muhsinin (kind people, philanthropists) totaling about 2,000 people, who were attained through calls on newstickers/running texts and descriptions on Rodjatv's account on Instagram and collected funds of around IDR 300 million per month, more than sufficient for Rodja's overall media operational costs. With Rodja's operational costs guaranteed, Salafists can sustainably reproduce social formations to maintain the status quo. Salafists also carry out commodification practices, namely turning things of value into products that can be marketed toward content, workers, and audiences (followers) through the "Rodja Parabola Outlet." With sales of the parabola that reached a volume of 100,000 units, it not only expanded the activities of representing Salafus Salih's ideology but also brought financial benefits to the sustainability of the mediatization of Rodja's religion.

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