

Model of State Defense Strengthening Responding to the Impact of Eliminating the Presidential Threshold in Order to Realize Inclusive Democracy

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia's democratic consolidation faces new challenges following the Constitutional Court's decision to eliminate the presidential threshold, fundamentally altering the political landscape and potentially affecting national defense mechanisms. In an era where political fragmentation can undermine governmental effectiveness and national security, understanding the relationship between electoral reforms and defense capabilities becomes crucial for maintaining state sovereignty. This research aims to develop a comprehensive model for strengthening national defense in response to the elimination of the presidential threshold to realize inclusive democracy. The method used is a mixed-method approach, combining qualitative analysis with NVivo 12 software and quantitative analysis using SEM PLS-4. The results of the research show that politics and democracy significantly affect National Defense, with a coefficient of 0.468 and a p-value of 0.023, which indicates a significant effect at the 5% significance level. This indicates that political stability and democracy have a greater role in forming national defense. The model of strengthening the coalition system in parliament can encourage inter-party consensus to maintain government stability, ensure that defense policies continue to operate, maintain the neutrality of the TNI, keep the National Police consistent and committed to state security, and maintain society's role in overseeing politics and democracy. This research contributes to defense policy literature by providing empirical evidence of how electoral system changes impact national security frameworks, offering practical insights for policymakers navigating democratic transitions while maintaining effective defense capabilities.

KEYWORDS

Defense, Political Fragmentation, President Threshold, Public, Separatist



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INTRODUCTION

Strengthening national defense is an effort to strengthen national capacity in dealing with threats through political stability, the effectiveness of democracy, and transparent governance so as to produce more responsive and accountable defense policies that are able to maintain national sovereignty and security in a sustainable manner. Inclusive democracy is a political system that guarantees all elements of society, without exception, have equal opportunity to participate in political processes and decision-making (Caliskan, 2019). This concept emphasizes the importance of openness, accessibility, and protection of political and civil rights so that no groups are marginalized in the dynamics of democracy. Political participation is one of the main pillars of democracy because through participation, the community can convey aspirations, choose leaders, and influence public policy. In the midst of increasingly complex global challenges, where democracy in several countries is facing scrutiny related to political polarization and social exclusion, high participation reflects better quality of democracy because the decisions taken by the government are more reflective of the will of the people (van de Sande, 2015).

Threshold in the political context refers to the minimum requirement that must be met by political parties or candidates to obtain seats in parliament or advance to certain stages in elections. This threshold is applied in the form of a parliamentary threshold and a presidential threshold. In Indonesia, political parties must meet the 4% national vote threshold to be able to fill seats in parliament, while the presidential threshold requires the party or party coalition to obtain 20% of the seats in the *DPR* or 25% of the national valid votes to nominate a presidential candidate. The urgency of this research stems from considering that Indonesia's political conditions are characterized by the transition of power, changes in regulation, and rapid social dynamics (Cooper, 2021). The decision of the Constitutional Court that eliminated the threshold for nominating regional head elections and the presidential threshold has the potential to significantly change the Indonesian political system. However, the Parliamentary Threshold still uses the old provisions based on Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, which requires political parties to reach a minimum of 4% of the total national votes or a minimum of 25% of the total valid votes in one province (Brierley et al., 2023).

The literature review in this research includes: Inclusive Democracy Theory, where Takis Fotopoulos (1997) confirms "the importance of broad political participation in the democratic process, where every element of society has the same opportunity to be involved in government." Political Stability Theory, where Samuel P. Huntington (1968) stressed that "political stability is a major factor in maintaining the resilience of the country" (Inboden, 2016). In National Defense System Theory, Barry Buzan (1991) confirms that "state defense does not only depend on military power, but also on political, economic, and social stability." Democratic Security Theory, where Bruce Russett (1993) said that "countries with strong democratic systems tend to have more stable and effective defense policies" (Christensen et al., 2017).

Previous research by Mattes & Stadlmair (2017) on the topic of challenges of democratic inclusion emphasized "normative challenges in achieving inclusive democracy, especially in the context of democratization and globalization, how complicated democratic inclusion is, and how different membership limits are in various aspects, such as how the law is made and political participation" (Warburton & Aspinall, 2019).

The novelty of this research lies in the integration of the impact of the elimination of the presidential threshold on national defense in the context of inclusive democracy. Different from the research of Mattes & Stadlmair (2017), which highlights the normative challenges of inclusive democracy, this research examines how changes in the political system affect stability and national defense policy (Nielsen et al., 2017).

The purpose is to formulate a model of strengthening national defense in responding to the impact of the elimination of the presidential threshold in order to realize inclusive democracy. This is important because changes in the political system can affect the stability and effectiveness of defense policies and national resilience in dealing with domestic and global threats (Arndt et al., 2023). The significance of this research lies in its potential to inform policy decisions that balance democratic inclusivity with national security imperatives, providing evidence-based recommendations for maintaining effective governance and defense capabilities during periods of political transition. The practical benefits include offering strategic frameworks for political leaders, defense planners, and civil society organizations to

navigate the complex relationship between electoral democracy and national security in the Indonesian context.

METHOD

This research employs a Mixed Methods Explanatory Sequential Design to explore the primary patterns and themes surrounding a model for strengthening state defense in response to the impact of eliminating the presidential threshold, aiming to realize inclusive democracy. The initial qualitative phase involved data collection through discussions with 35 postgraduate Defense Sciences students, supplemented by secondary data from observer opinions, news media, and literature studies. This qualitative data was analyzed using *NVivo* 12 software, where interview results were imported, coded, and examined with the Run Query feature before being visualized in a Word Cloud for final interpretation.

The subsequent quantitative phase involved distributing questionnaires to the same 35 students using random sampling, with the data analyzed through Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling (SEM PLS). The PLS model evaluation consists of assessing the outer (measurement) model and the inner (structural) model. The outer model's validity was tested using outer loadings (recommended >0.70) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE >0.50), while reliability was confirmed with Cronbach's Alpha and Composite Reliability (both >0.70). Discriminant validity was established using the Fornell-Larcker Criterion and HTMT ratio (<0.90). The inner model was then evaluated for multicollinearity (inner VIF < 5) and hypothesis testing through bootstrapping to examine path coefficients and their significance ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$), alongside measuring effect size (F Square) and model fit using R Square, SRMR (<0.08), and PLS Predict.

The study tests specific direct and indirect effect hypotheses concerning the relationships between the elimination of the presidential threshold, politics and democracy, and national defense. The direct effects hypothesize that the elimination of the threshold directly affects national defense (H_1) and politics/democracy (H_2), and that politics/democracy directly affects national defense (H_3). Furthermore, an indirect effect is hypothesized, proposing that the elimination of the presidential threshold influences national defense through the mediation of politics and democracy (H_4), with the significance of this mediation path also determined by a $p\text{-value}$ of less than 0.05.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Qualitative data analysis with NVivo 12



Figure 1. Word Cloud from NVivo 12

In the Word Cloud NVivo 12 image display above, showing a prominent word, includes political, threshold, elimination, government, effectiveness, democracy, representation, security, stability, and defense. This reflects the close relationship between the impact of the elimination of the presidential threshold and political fragmentation, government effectiveness, and national defense stability. The elimination of the presidential nomination threshold can have the potential to increase political fragmentation because this opens greater opportunities for small parties to nominate their candidates. Judging from the party system fragmentation theory put forward by Sartori (1976), he said that "the more political actors competing in the election, the more likely the formation of unstable government because it can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of decision-making at the executive and legislative levels, and then without a strong majority in parliament, strategic policies can be hampered by the attraction of the more complex political interests".

According to Governance and State Effectiveness Theory, Fukuyama (2013) said that "the effectiveness of government is one of the aspects that is strongly influenced by the political dynamics after the elimination of the threshold of the presidential nomination. The effectiveness of government depends on the capacity of state institutions to carry out policies consistently and coordinated; if political fragmentation increases, Furthermore, national security stability is an important issue that arises in NVivo analysis in the bag, as seen from the dominance of the words security, stability, and defense. According to the perspective of neorealism, Waltz (1979), the internal stability of a country will determine its national resilience in dealing with external threats. Political instability can open a gap for the emergence of social conflicts, separatist movements, and other threats that can weaken the country's defense (Renic, 2019). In Indonesia, the potential for conflict in regions such as Papua and border areas is a serious concern if the government formed has no strong control in managing national security. To balance the needs of a democracy that is more inclusive with national security stability, the model of strengthening national defense must be designed adaptively against political change. Democratic Governance Theory by Held (2006) emphasized that

"state defense strategies must include increasing defense institutional capacity, closer coordination between government and military agencies, as well as optimizing local resources in maintaining stability in conflict-prone areas (Suchkov, 2021).

The conclusion from this analysis in NVivo 12 in Tasa is that, with the elimination of the presidential threshold, of course, in the future there will be broad consequences for the effectiveness of government and national security stability, which is certain to lead to the occurrence of political fragmentation in parliament that is increasing and is concerned with the potential to weaken decision-making at the government level so that it can have an impact on policy effectiveness involving public interests, including state defense interests (Mecklin, 2017).

Quantitative data analysis with SEM PLS-4

Outer Model Evaluation




Figure 2. Outer Loading SEM PLS-4

In Figure 2 above, a structural model for path analysis is shown, where the value in the path shows the relationship between the independent variable (x), the mediation variable (m), and the dependent variable (Y). The coefficient of relationships between variables indicates the strength of the influence of one variable on other variables. As an indicator of independent variables, X1, X2, and X3 have a high charge factor (> 0.90), which shows that these variables have a strong construct representation (Et.al, 2021). In addition, there is a significant correlation value between the independent variables and mediation variables (M1, M2, and M3), with the highest coefficient in M1 of 0.878, showing that political and democratic aspects played a significant role in the influence of the elimination of the president's threshold on national defense.

The relationship coefficient from the mediation variable to the dependent variable (Y1, Y2, and Y3) is also quite significant, with the highest value of 0.468 from M2 to Y. Therefore, the findings of this analysis support the argument that the elimination of the president's threshold can indirectly influence the country's defense through the political and democratic components, so that the policy must consider the balance between national stability and democratic inclusiveness (Nabila et al., 2023).

Table 1. Outer Loadings

Indicator (manifest variables)	Elimination of Presidential Threshold	National Defense	Politics and Democracy
M1: Effectiveness of government			0.878
M2: Balance of Political Representation			0.841
M3: Elimination of Parliamentary Threshold			0.848
X1: Openness of political competition	0.926		
X2: The dynamics of the political coalition	0.955		
X3: Political fragmentation in parliament	0.848		
Y1: National security stability		0.797	
Y2: The effectiveness of strategic decision making		0.865	
Y3: Response to separatist threats		0.848	

As shown by the results of Outer Loadings in Table 1, the indicators used in this research make a significant contribution to the measured variables. The dynamics of the political coalition have the highest loading value in the elimination of the presidential threshold variable; the next indicator is the openness of political competition (0.926) and political fragmentation in Parliament (0.848). This condition shows that the elimination of the threshold for presidential nomination can make political competition more open and accelerate political division in parliament. In terms of national defense, high political fragmentation can cause government instability. In the end, this has an impact on the strategic ability to make decisions to face national threats. In terms of national defense, the National Defense variable has a strong relationship with three main indicators: National Security Stability (0.797), The Effectiveness of Strategic Decision Making (0.865), and Response to Separatist Threats (0.848)(Sujati et al., 2020).

This condition also confirms the stability of national security and the effectiveness of strategic decision-making is greatly influenced by the political dynamics that occur due to changes in election rules. If political fragmentation is increasing, providing opportunities for separatist groups to take advantage of this moment to undermine the government. The theory of neorealism by Waltz (1979) said that if a state with a stable political system tends to have a stronger defense, it is because security policies can be implemented consistently without being disturbed by divided political interests. However, the political and democratic variables show how effective the government is in a more inclusive democracy. With the highest indicators, such as the effectiveness of government (0.878), the balance of political representation (0.841), and the elimination of the parliamentary threshold (0.848), it can be concluded that the elimination of the threshold of the presidential nomination can increase political participation but also lead to challenges to maintain the balance of political representation and the effectiveness of government. According to Held (2006), "mechanisms that can balance political openness and state stability are needed for effective governance in an inclusive democratic system. The strengthening of the national defense system must consider the impact of political

fragmentation to ensure that security policies continue to run optimally in facing various challenges that arise as a result of changes in the political system (Williams, 2014).

Table 2. Construct Reliability and Validity

Construct (latent variable)	Cronbach's alpha	Composite reliability (rho_a)	Composite reliability (rho_c)	Average variance extracted (AVE)
Elimination of Presidential Threshold	0.931	1.002	0.954	0.874
National Defense	0.798	0.822	0.875	0.701
Politics and Democracy	0.822	0.860	0.891	0.732

In T table 2, it presents the results of construct reliability and validity that measure the extent of the variables in this research that have internal consistency and validity and convergent. Cronbach's Alpha for the three variables of the Elimination of Presidential Threshold (0.931), National Defense (0.798), and Politics and Democracy (0.822). The results show a high level of reliability, where the value above 0.7 is considered good enough to ensure the consistency between indicators in one construct. These results reinforce that the instruments used in this research have a strong reliability to measure the impact of the elimination of the president's threshold on national defense and democracy. From the perspective of validity, the value of composition reliability (RHO_C) for each variable is greater than 0.7, which shows that the indicators used have a high level of internal consistency. For the Elimination of Presidential Threshold variable, the RHO_C value reaches 0.954, showing that this construct is very accurate in observing the phenomenon under research. However, research variables have good convergent validity, as indicated by the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) value above 0.5 for each variable (Muslimin et al., 2021).

This shows that the indicators of each variable can significantly explain the measured latent variable. These results have a significant consequence of the State Defense Strengthening Responding Research Model to the Impact of Removing the Presidential Threshold in Order to Realize Inclusive Democracy. The results of this research are very valid and reliable so that it can be used to explain how the elimination of the threshold of presidential nomination has an impact on political dynamics, government effectiveness, and state defense stability. In this case, the theory of institutionalism by March & Olsen (1989) is relevant because it emphasizes that institutional changes in the political system, such as the elimination of the president's threshold, can affect the structure of government and national defense policies. Therefore, this research underlines how important it is to make proportional political policies to ensure that more inclusive democracy does not interfere with the stability of the country or government performance (Nugroho, 2024).

Table 3. Discriminant Validity- Heterotrait Monotrait Ratio (HTMT)

Construct (latent variable)	Elimination of Presidential Threshold	National Defense	Politics and Democracy
Elimination of Presidential Threshold			
National Defense	0.447		

Construct (latent variable)	Elimination of Presidential Threshold	National Defense	Politics and Democracy
Politics and Democracy	0.338	0.679	

Table 3 shows the results of discriminant validity using the heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) method. The HTMT value is used to assess the extent of the construct in this research that has good discrimination or does not experience multicollinearity problems. In research that uses the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) method, the HTMT value that is lower than 0.85 is considered an indication that each variable has a clear difference from the others (Rawi & Gusmao, 2022). According to the table, the HTMT value between the elimination of thetical thresholdial threshold and national defense is 0.447, while between the elimination of thetical thresholdial threshold and politics and democracy is 0.338. Both values are far below the threshold of 0.85, which shows that these variables have good discrimination and there is no indication that they measure the same ideas. Meanwhile, the relationship between national and political defense and democracy shows the HTMT value of 0.679, which is still below the tolerance limit and shows a strong relationship; however, this value can still be distinguished as two separate variables (Stiglitz, 2016).

These results have a direct impact on the State Defense Strengthening Research Model Responding to the Impact of Eliminating the Presidential Threshold in Order to Realize Inclusive Democracy. With a good discriminant validity, this research can provide justification that the elimination of the threshold for presidential nomination affects the dynamics of politics and democracy and the national defense system. This result, in the context of democratic consolidation theory (Linz & Stepan, 1996), shows that, so that political fragmentation does not have a negative impact on national stability and the effectiveness of government, changes in political rules must be balanced with adaptive defense policies (Padmi, 2019)

Table 4. Fornell - Larcker Criterion

Construct (latent variable)	Elimination of Presidential Threshold	National Defense	Politics and Democracy
Elimination of Presidential Threshold	0.935		
National Defense	0.477	0.837	
Politics and Democracy	0.311	0.571	0.856

In Table 4, which presents the results of the Discriminant Validity test using the Fornell-Larcker Criterion, the results show that the research model has a strong discriminant validity. The quadratic root value of the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each Elimination of Presidential Threshold (0.935), National Defense (0.837), and Politics and Democracy (0.856) constructs indicates that each construct is more closely correlated with the indicators themselves. This indicates that the variables in the model have clarity in measuring the aspects you want to analyze. These results support the argument that, from the point of view of political and defense theory, the elimination of the president's threshold has a different effect on national defense and political development. According to the theory of Huntington's political stability (1968), policies that increase political divisions can reduce the efficiency of government, which can have an impact on the state's reaction to defense threats. As a result, although the president's boundaries can increase the inclusion of democracy, strategic steps in the national defense

system are still needed to maintain national political and security stability (Parubochaya & Piskunov, 2018).

Inner Model

Table 5. R-square

Construct (latent variable)	R-square	R-square adjusted
National Defense	0.425	0.411
Politics and Democracy	0.097	0.085

The number of independent variables capable of explaining the dependent variable in the research model is shown in Table 5. The coefficient of determination, or a square value of R, is used to measure the strength of structural models to explain the variability of latent constructs. The results show that the country's defense construct has an R-squared value of 0.425, which shows that the president's threshold variable and political and democratic variables contributed 42.5% of the national defense variability. On the other hand, the lower adjusted R-squared value, which is 0.411, shows that the explanation contribution is slightly reduced after changing the number of predictors in the model. Conversely, the Construct Politics and Democracy has an R-Square of 0.097, which shows that only 9.7% of political and democratic variability can be explained by independent variables in the model. This value is relatively low and shows that other factors outside the model may have a greater influence on political dynamics and democracy. In addition, the adjusted R-squared value of 0.085 shows that after adjusting, the effect of pre-adjustment on political dynamics (Hair et al., 2012).

Table 6. Direct Effect

Construct (latent variable)	Original sample (O)	Sample mean (M)	Standard deviation (STDEV)	T statistics (O/STDEV)	P values
Elimination of Presidential Threshold -> National Defense	0.331	0.337	0.197	1.682	0.093
Elimination of Presidential Threshold -> Politics and Democracy	0.311	0.336	0.187	1.665	0.096
Politics and Democracy -> National Defense	0.468	0.500	0.205	2.280	0.023

The results of the relationship analysis between latent constructs in the research model are shown in Table 6. The initial sample value (O) shows the direction and magnitude of the influence, while the P value indicates the significance of the relationship. The initial results show that the influence of the elimination of the president's threshold on national defense is not significant at a significance level of 5% ($p < 0.05$). This relationship has a coefficient of 0.331 with a P-value of 0.093. This shows that, although the elimination of the president's threshold helps national defense, its influence is still weak or there are other factors that are more dominating. The relationship between the elimination of the presidential threshold to politics and democracy has a coefficient of 0.311 with a p-value of 0.096, which is also not significant. Although the elimination of the president's threshold can have an impact on political dynamics and democracy, this result shows that there are other variables that are more influential in forming a more inclusive political system. Conversely, the relationship between

politics and democracy to the National Defense shows a coefficient of 0.468 with a p-value of 0.023, which means a significant effect on the 5% significance level. This shows that political and democratic factors have a greater role in shaping national defense than directly eliminating the president's threshold (Rannie et al., 2024) .

This is in line with the theory of Democratic Peace Theory (Rustsett, 1993), which states that a more democratic and stable political system contributes positively to the security and defense of the country by strengthening the effectiveness of strategic decision-making and national security stability. The results of the analysis show that politics and democracy have a significant influence on national defense, with a coefficient of 0.468 and a P-value of 0.023, which shows this relationship is strong and significant at a significance level of 5%. These results indicate that the dynamics of politics and democracy have a greater role in forming national defense policies rather than eliminating the president's threshold directly. According to the theory of democratic peace (Russett, 1993), a more democratic and stable political system tends to make strategic decisions of the country's defense more effective. Countries with stable democracies usually have better supervision and balance systems, more transparent and accountable defense policies, and more stable national security. Stable democracy allows the government to make a widely agreed defense policy, which reduces impulsive or non-strategic policy risks in responding to threats that arise at the national and international levels (Rahman et al., 2023).

In addition, neo-institutionalism theory (North, 1990) emphasizes that strong and democratic political institutions play an important role in the formation of more efficient defense policies. Countries that have good political stability and democratic governance can build a flexible defense system that focuses on the long-term interests of the state and is able to respond to threats with a more measurable strategy. In the Indonesian context, strengthening democracy can help national defense by ensuring that the strategic policy of the defense sector is arranged logically, based on in-depth considerations, and supported by strong political legitimacy. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of national defense in a sustainable manner, national defense policies should be more directed at the development of a stable and democratic political system rather than just reducing the threshold of presidential nomination. The result is that, although the elimination of the president's threshold has an impact on democracy and national defense, the impact is not strong enough or significant. Conversely, more stable democracy has a greater impact on strengthening the country's defense system directly. Therefore, the defense strengthening strategy must concentrate on a more inclusive and stable democratic system than the president's threshold (Sukmawan & Pratama, 2023).

Table 7. The results of the indirect influence

Construct (latent variable)	Original sample (O)	Sample mean (M)	Standard deviation (STDEV)	T statistics ((O/STDEV))	P values
Elimination of Presidential Threshold -> National Defense	0.145	0.159	0.113	1.288	0.198

Table 7 shows the results of the indirect influence of the variable of the elimination of the president's boundaries on national defense with politics and democracy as a mediation variable. The results of the analysis show that the elimination of the president's threshold has an indirect

positive effect on national defense, with an initial sample value (O) of 0.145. However, this effect is not significant at a significance level of 5% ($p < 0.05$). The T-statistic value is only 1.288, and the P-value value is only 0.198. This finding shows that, although the elimination of the president's threshold can affect national defense through political dynamics and democracy, this impact is not strong enough to be considered statistically significant. That is, policy changes related to the presidential candidacy do not necessarily automatically increase the country's resilience (Hornor, 2017).

Table 8. f-square

Construct (latent variable)	Elimination of Presidential Threshold	National Defense	Politics and Democracy
Elimination of Presidential Threshold		0.173	0.107
National Defense			
Politics and Democracy		0.344	

Table 8 shows the F-Square (Effect Size) value, which measures the magnitude of the influence of the latent variable on other variables in the model. This value helps understand the extent to which independent variables affect the dependent variable relatively in the structural model. The results of the analysis show that the effect of the elimination of the president's threshold on national defense has a moderate effect, with an F-Square value of 0.173. This can be associated with the theory of political institutionalism, which emphasizes that changes in the political system can affect the effectiveness of defense policies, especially in terms of stability and strategic decision-making. Nevertheless, the influence of the elimination of the president's threshold on democracy and politics is relatively small, with an F-Square value of 0.107. Although the elimination of the president's threshold allows more candidates, its impact on democracy and political stability is not significant. Therefore, although the reform of the election system may have an impact on politics and democracy, the impact tends to be smaller than the impact possessed by other components that are more structural. Conversely, with the value of F-Square of 0.344, democracy and politics have proven to greatly affect the defense of the country. This shows that shifts in politics and democracy have a major impact on defense policy performance, which includes maintaining national security and responding to threats such as separatism (Zahidi et al., 2024).

Evaluation of the kindness of the model compatibility

Table 9. PLSpredict/CVPAT

Indicator (manifest variables)	Q²predict	PLS-SEM_RMSE	PLS-SEM_MAE	LM_RMSE	LM_MAE
Y1: National security stability	0.330	0.239	0.132	0.202	0.087
Y2: The effectiveness of strategic decision making	0.012	0.337	0.173	0.312	0.174
Y3: Response to separatist threats	-0.091	0.354	0.187	0.317	0.182
M1: Effectiveness of government	0.044	0.281	0.157	0.313	0.166

Indicator (manifest variables)	Q ² predict	PLS-SEM_RMSE	PLS-SEM_MAE	LM_RMS E	LM_MAE
M2: Balance of Political Representation	-0.067	0.311	0.184	0.340	0.200
M3: Elimination of Parliamentary Threshold	0.048	0.294	0.174	0.327	0.181

Table 9 shows the results of PLS predictions using CVPAT criteria. The CVPAT criteria evaluate the predictive ability of the model by comparing predictive errors between modeling equation partial least squares (PLS-SEM) and linear regression (LM). The Q²predict value for national security stability (0.330) shows a fairly good prediction and shows that the model can explain the stability of national security quite accurately. Positive values indicate better predictions compared to average or benchmark. However, the negative results of the Response to Separatist Threats (-0.091) variable and the Balance of Political Representation (-0.067) show that the model cannot predict this variable better than the average method. From the perspective of defense and political policy, this result strengthens the argument that the structural and institutional factors that have been considered in the model affect the stability of national security. Conversely, Q² predictions for the effectiveness of strategic decision-making are 0.012, and Q² predictions for government effectiveness are 0.044. This shows that there are other variables that have not been accommodated in the model. According to institutionalism theory (North, 1990), policy success, including in the field of defense and security, is very dependent on how well the institution supports it. In addition, the theory of democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996) states that imbalances in political representation can interfere with political stability, which in turn reduces the efficiency of strategic decision-making (Papulova & Gazova, 2016).

Table 10. CVPAT- PLS-SEM vs. Indicator average

Construct (latent variable)	PLS loss	IA loss	Average loss difference	t value	p value
National Defense	0.099	0.105	-0.006	0.571	0.570
Politics and Democracy	0.087	0.088	-0.001	0.080	0.936
Overall	0.093	0.097	-0.004	0.399	0.691

To evaluate the predictive ability of the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) and the average indicator method (IA loss), an evaluation of the cross-validated predictive abilities test (CVPAT) is carried out. The results show that the PLS-SEM model has better prediction capabilities if the value of loss is greater than PLS-SEM. In this research, the model was tested on two main variables: politics and democracy and national defense. The aim is to find out how much the elimination of the president's threshold has an impact on democracy and national defense. The results of the analysis showed that for the national defense variable, the value of the PLS loss was 0.099 smaller than it was 0.105, with an average loss difference of -0.006. This shows that the PLS-SEM model has little advantage in predictions compared to the average indicator approach. However, the p-value of 0.570 is greater than 0.05, which shows that this difference is not statistically significant. In other

words, although there are small differences in predictions, the model is not strong enough to provide statistically reliable results to explain the relationship between the elimination of the president's threshold and national defense (Heo & Bohte, 2012).

In political and democratic variables, the difference in the loss of PLS is 0.087, and it is 0.088, a very small difference, with an average loss difference of only 0.001. This shows that the predictive ability of the PLS-SEM model is almost no different from the average indicator approach. In addition, a very high p-value (0.936) shows that there is no significant difference between the two methods, indicating that the model used has no advantage in predicting the influence of this policy on democracy and the political system. Overall, the model shows that the PLS loss of 0.093 is slightly lower than the IA loss of 0.097, with an average loss difference of -0.004. Although the PLS-SEM model is slightly superior in predictions compared to the average indicator approach, the results are not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.691. This indicates that the model used still needs improvement in order to increase prediction accuracy and provide more reliable conclusions (Slater, 2013).

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that political stability and the quality of democracy play a more significant role in shaping effective national defense than the direct impact of eliminating the presidential threshold. The research demonstrates that while the removal of the threshold aims to foster a more inclusive democratic process, its direct effect on defense outcomes is statistically insignificant. Instead, a stable and well-functioning democratic system—characterized by effective governance, balanced political representation, and institutional strength—proves to be a stronger predictor of robust national defense capabilities. This underscores the importance of prioritizing political cohesion and democratic resilience as foundational elements for enhancing state security and strategic decision-making in response to both internal and external threats.

For future research, it is recommended to adopt a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates economic, social, and geopolitical variables—such as hybrid warfare risks, economic stability, and international relations—to provide a more holistic understanding of national defense mechanisms. Additionally, expanding the scope of the study to include a broader range of stakeholders, such as defense policymakers, civil society organizations, and international actors, would enrich the analysis. Longitudinal and comparative studies across different political systems could also help identify best practices for balancing democratic inclusivity with national security needs, ultimately contributing to more resilient and adaptive defense policies in evolving democratic contexts.

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