

GLOBAL JIHAD AND LOCAL SENTIMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE HAMAS-ISRAEL CONFLICT ON RADICALIZATION IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

The prolonged conflict between Hamas and Israel has significant impacts on the social and political dynamics in various countries, including Indonesia. This study aims to analyze how this conflict affects radicalization and the development of terrorism ideology in Indonesia. The methodology employed is a qualitative approach based on narrative analysis through document studies and secondary data. This research applies the Relative Deprivation Theory to explain the dissatisfaction felt by Indonesian Muslims regarding the conditions in Palestine, and the Framing Theory to understand how the conflict narrative is framed by radical groups. The findings indicate that the narrative of Palestinian suffering and the legitimacy of jihad are used by extremist groups to recruit new members and garner support. Additionally, this phenomenon contributes to an increase in anti-Israel sentiment among Indonesian society. The findings reveal the complex relationship between international conflicts and local radicalization, which calls for more serious attention from the government in addressing potential terrorism threats arising from these sentiments.

KEYWORDS Global Jihad, Local Sentiment, Hamas-Israel Conflict and Radicalization, Indonesia



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INTRODUCTION

The prolonged conflict between Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah) or the Islamic Resistance Movement, and Israel is one of the most internationally prominent movements, rooted in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. International events, especially those involving Muslims, can influence radical sentiments (Fealy, 2005). This conflict not only has direct implications for the Middle East but also significantly impacts various parts of the world, including Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population and strong emotional and solidaristic ties to Palestinian issues. The context of the Hamas-Israel conflict is frequently used by radical groups in Indonesia to build jihad narratives, strengthen ideological bases, recruit new members, and garner support. Various radical and terrorist movements in Indonesia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Chalmers, 2017) and groups affiliated with ISIS (Zulkarnain & Purnama, 2016) and Al-Qaeda (Kostanian, 2021), often exploit anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian sentiments to recruit new members and bolster the legitimacy of their actions.

Often, the narrative of Palestinian suffering and “occupation” by Israel is used as an effective propaganda tool to generate sympathy and support from the broader public. Visual documentation, including images and videos of atrocities and calls for jihad in defense of Palestine, are frequently employed tactics to incite radical actions (Fealy, 2005). Furthermore, the phenomenon of globalization facilitates the spread of information and radical ideologies through the internet and social media, allowing the Israel-Palestine conflict narrative to rapidly disseminate and influence individual perceptions and actions in Indonesia (Syauqillah, 2022). This issue extends beyond bilateral concerns and touches on issues of identity, Human Rights (HR), and nationalism in various countries, including Indonesia (Febi et al., 2024).

In 2023-2024, this situation becomes increasingly relevant for research, given the intensification of the conflict and its widespread impact. This article will explore various aspects of the influence of Hamas resistance against Israel and its effects on terrorist movements and radical groups in Indonesia. Using Relative Deprivation Theory, the article will identify how the Hamas-Israel conflict narrative is utilized as a tool for fundraising solidarity for Palestine and for building a narrative of Islamic struggle and recruiting members for radical groups in Indonesia.

The Hamas-Israel conflict exacerbates the sense of injustice and oppression felt by Muslim communities, which is exploited by radical groups to enhance recruitment and gain sympathy. Relative Deprivation Theory highlights how dissatisfaction experienced by individuals or groups, when they feel they are not receiving what they believe they deserve, can be mobilized for radicalization purposes (Gurr, 2011).

Meanwhile, Frame Theory will identify the narratives and propaganda used by radical groups in Indonesia related to the Hamas-Israel conflict. This theory explains how issues are defined, selected, and presented to the public to shape their perceptions and responses. Radical groups in Indonesia use framing to depict the Hamas-Israel conflict as a religious struggle that requires solidarity and action from Muslims worldwide (Entman, 1993). This will allow for a more in-depth examination of the specific impact of the Hamas-Israel conflict on Indonesian society.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article employs an in-depth qualitative approach supported by narrative and relevant theoretical analysis. The qualitative approach allows researchers to understand the context, motivations, and perceptions of individuals and groups related to the research topic. Through document analysis and case studies, this approach provides deep insights into the influence of international conflicts on radicalization at the local level. Thus, this method is suitable for exploring complex social phenomena such as radicalization, where interactions and subjective interpretations are crucial (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

In this research, a key aspect of understanding the impact of the Hamas-Israel conflict on radicalization in Indonesia is the comprehensive application of library research methods. By using Relative Deprivation Theory and Framing Theory, the study aims to reveal how the conflict influences the motivations and actions of terrorist movements or radical groups in Indonesia.

With careful library research methods and the application of Relative Deprivation Theory and Framing Theory, this research hopes to provide valuable insights into the influence of international conflicts on the dynamics of radicalization at the local level in Indonesia.

Library research involves collecting data from various sources such as books, reports, academic journals, and relevant articles. This method is used because it is well-suited for obtaining a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the Hamas-Israel conflict and its impact on radical groups in Indonesia (Zed, 2014).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative Deprivation Theory concerns the feelings of dissatisfaction or injustice experienced by individuals or groups when they perceive a gap between their expectations and their actual situation. This dissatisfaction can drive collective action or radicalization (Gurr, 2011). The theory is a sociological concept that explains social movements and collective actions as responses to perceived inequalities. It arises when individuals or groups feel they have lost resources or rights compared to others, leading to frustration and potential conflict. Relative deprivation itself refers to the experience of losing something that one believes they are entitled to compared to others (Gurney & Tierney, 1982).

This theory illustrates the feelings of injustice and oppression experienced by Muslim communities worldwide, including in Indonesia. Radical groups can use the narrative of Israeli oppression against Palestinians to highlight the sense of relative deprivation felt by Muslims, who believe that Muslims globally are being treated unfairly. This sense of deprivation can lead to acts of terrorism, such as the 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia, which were carried out as retaliation for the Israel-Palestine conflict. Similarly, in response to the Hamas-Israel conflict in 2023, social movements in Indonesia, such as demonstrations, emerged to express frustration and solidarity.

Framing Theory

Framing Theory relates to how issues, problems, or conflicts are presented to the public in order to shape their views and responses. Framing can direct public perception and influence interpretations of an issue (Entman, 1993). According to Entman (1993), there are negative impacts of the Hamas-Israel conflict on Indonesia. In Indonesia, this can be observed through media coverage, both in print and online, which often reports on civilian casualties, infrastructure destruction, and human rights violations. Consequently, the public in Indonesia may develop deep empathy for the Palestinian people and view the conflict as a significant injustice that needs to be addressed.

Media coverage, including on social media platforms like Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, X, and others, often frames the issue in terms of injustice and suffering. This framing can provoke anger and frustration among the Indonesian public, which in turn may lead to protests and even extreme anti-Semitic or anti-Israel sentiments. Both Relative Deprivation Theory and Framing Theory demonstrate how perceptions and emotions can be converted into collective actions by actors skilled in manipulating public sentiment.

Discussion

Implications of Middle Eastern Conflicts in Indonesia

Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the Syrian Civil War, the Persian Gulf War, and tensions in Yemen, especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, have significant implications for Indonesian national politics. For instance, the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) network in Indonesia has been actively supporting the Syrian conflict since 2012, particularly through fundraising and sending members for military training. Historically, various terrorist actions in Indonesia have involved JI, but recently there has been a shift. The JI network in Indonesia now focuses more on ideological battles and political influence, such as recruiting members to be sent to Syria, while politically opposing ISIS and considering it deviant (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2017).

The political implications in Indonesia impact the country's foreign policy. Indonesia's position has been consistently supportive of Palestinian independence, which affects its diplomatic relations with countries involved in the conflict and triggers social and political responses domestically (Perwita, 2007). As a majority Muslim country, Indonesia shows strong support for Palestine. The Indonesian government actively advocates for Palestinian interests through the United Nations (UN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and other bilateral initiatives (Effendy, 2003). This conflict also affects Indonesia's diplomatic relations with countries that support Israel, such as the United States. Indonesia has consistently supported Palestine to the extent of not maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel (Pratiwi et al., 2022).

In addition to political and diplomatic implications, there are other consequences, such as recruitment and mobilization efforts that intentionally legitimize extremist views. This rhetoric is exploited by radical groups to recruit members by portraying themselves as defenders of Islam (Pratiwi et al., 2022). For example, the Bali Bombings on October 12, 2002, were one of the largest terrorist

attacks in Indonesia. This event was motivated by retaliation for the killing of Muslims in Jenin in the West Bank of Palestine. Umar Patek and his associates from Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) carried out this act of revenge in Bali, Indonesia, targeting foreign nationals in the area (SKSG UI, 2023a).

The Persian Gulf War, which began in 1990, had economic impacts on Indonesia. Global oil prices were affected by the war, leading to a decrease in Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to rising import costs for oil and inflationary pressures. The increase in oil prices also impacted Indonesia's budget deficit, with interest rates tending to rise, thereby affecting economic growth. The Persian Gulf War also affected Indonesia's balance of payments, causing a trade balance deterioration due to escalating import costs, while export values stagnated and declined due to weakened economic conditions, and the Indonesian Rupiah experienced depreciation (Sasmitasiwi & Cahyadin, 2008). The economic impact was also felt in Indonesia due to the war in Yemen, particularly on export performance to the Middle East and North Africa (Noor & Mursid, 2024).

The roots of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia can also be traced back to the Darul Islam (DI) movement, which emphasized a local Islamic state narrative resonating with the global Islamic struggle, including Palestine. International conflicts also act as catalysts for local radicalization within the Indonesian Islamic State Movement (NII). The Israel-Palestine conflict is often cited by extremists to justify violence against global Muslim oppression. Furthermore, narratives of Muslim oppression in Palestine are exploited by radical groups to recruit new members, spreading the narrative of inaction towards the injustices faced by oppressed Muslims. Certain Indonesian Islamic groups (Machmudi, 2021), such as Jamaah Islamiyah, which has close ties with Al-Qaeda (Abuza, 2003; SKSG UI, 2023b), have been influenced by global jihad movements, including the Palestinian struggle as part of their jihad narrative (Machmudi, 2021).

Thus, the conflicts occurring in the Middle East have had negative impacts on Indonesia's economy, society, and politics. These include the emergence of Islamic groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and the Dewan Mujahidin Indonesia (DMI), which arose as a response to perceived discriminatory U.S. foreign policies towards the Islamic world. In Indonesia, there has also been an increase in religious tensions due to the Middle Eastern conflicts, leading to significant public sentiment in support of Palestine, which has resulted in protests and social unrest. Political implications include the Indonesian government's stance on the Middle Eastern conflicts, which influences national policies, particularly regarding religious freedom and treatment of Islamic groups, and contributes to radicalization within Indonesia. Additionally, the economic effects of the Middle Eastern conflicts have led to regional instability, deterring foreign investors, and impacting crucial trade routes for Indonesia's economy. The tensions in the Middle East have also resulted in increased military spending to ensure security (Effendy, 2003).

The Hamas-Israel Conflict

The Palestinian struggle for their homeland and rights has been ongoing for decades, starting from 1948 with the establishment of the state of Israel. During this

formation, many Palestinians were displaced from their land by Israel, which then proceeded to occupy and forcibly take Palestinian territory (Khalidi, 2007). In 1967, following the Six-Day War, Israel annexed and took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This annexation is considered a violation of international law (Resolution 242, 1967).

The Israel-Palestine conflict has perpetually remained in a state of flux. In response to this status quo, Hamas, as a militant Palestinian organization, has carried out attacks. For Hamas, attacking is not just a political strategy but an existential necessity, as they view the Israeli occupation as a threat to the existence of the Palestinian people, necessitating violent resistance. Hamas's operations are retaliatory actions against Israeli aggression, including military operations and other forms of violence against Palestinians. Hamas uses violence to assert its political power and influence among Palestinians. By engaging in attacks, Hamas aims to position itself as the defender of Palestinian rights, often in contrast to political factions that might support negotiations over armed conflict (Nakhleh, 1971).

The Hamas-Israel conflict involves numerous events such as military attacks, tensions in contested areas, rocket attacks, and more. This conflict has persisted for years with periods of escalation and de-escalation. Both Hamas and Israel frequently accuse each other of human rights violations. The conflict illustrates the complex political and social dynamics in the Middle East. The most noticeable impact of the conflict is humanitarian, with numerous casualties from airstrikes, ground battles, refugees, and destroyed infrastructure. The economic life suffers from acute disruptions, with significant losses, especially in agriculture, trade, and industry. The Hamas-Israel conflict causes global tensions that impact regional stability in neighboring countries. On a global level, the conflict results in regional tensions affecting surrounding nations and a growing polarization in global politics.

Hamas is known for using hard power or military force. The organization does not hesitate to carry out rocket attacks against Israel, which are often met with similar retaliatory strikes by Israel. Hamas is organized into several distinct wings:

1. The Mass Mobilization Wing
2. The Security Wing, formerly known as Majd, established in 1983
3. The Military Wing, formed in 1992 and known as Mujahidu Falistiniyin or Al-Mujahidun. This wing is more commonly referred to as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, named in honor of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a prominent Palestinian nationalist leader who was killed in Britain in 1935. This wing is also known by other names such as the Students of Ayyash, Students of the Engineer, or Yahya Ayyash Units, named after Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas bomb-making expert killed in 1996.
4. The Political Wing, which has won various local elections in areas like Gaza, Nablus, and Qalqilya, and also won the Palestinian parliamentary elections.

Israel has isolated the Hamas movement, especially regarding armaments, but Hamas has managed to acquire various weapons from outside Palestine and has also produced weapons locally. Some of these weapons have even come from Israel

itself. Hamas has armed its fighters with weapons stolen from Israeli military bases, as Israeli weapon depots are vulnerable to theft. Thousands of bullets, hundreds of weapons, and grenades have been stolen and smuggled into Gaza and the West Bank via Sinai. Hamas has also cleverly repurposed unexploded Israeli bombs into explosives for their rockets. Approximately 10% of ammunition typically fails to detonate, and the failure rate for Israeli missiles can be as high as 15%. Sporadic bombings by Israel in Gaza have left the area littered with unexploded ordnance. A single unexploded bomb weighing 344 kg can be reprocessed by Hamas into hundreds of rockets and missiles (Patnistik, 2024).

The conflict between Hamas and Israel falls into the category of military conflict, making weapons a critical necessity for both sides as tools of warfare. This conflict includes numerous events, such as:

- 2006 Legislative Elections: After Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and took control of Gaza from Fatah, tensions between Hamas and Israel escalated. This resulted in rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli-occupied territories, triggering massive military responses from Israel.

- Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009): On December 27, 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead, starting with airstrikes targeting Hamas military installations. This operation continued with a ground invasion of Gaza beginning on January 3, 2009, and ended on January 18, 2009, with a unilateral ceasefire announced by Israel. The conflict resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, mostly soldiers, along with significant damage to Gaza's infrastructure (B'Tselem, 2009; Human Rights Council, 2009).

- Operation Pillar of Defense (2012): In November 2012, rocket attacks from Gaza led Israel to launch Operation Pillar of Defense. This eight-day operation ended with a ceasefire mediated by Egypt on November 21, 2012 (ICG, 2012). The operation resulted in the deaths of 174 Palestinians and 6 Israelis, including Israeli soldiers. The escalation of violence continued with the killing of Ahmad Jabari, a senior Hamas military commander, by Israel on November 14, 2012, further intensifying the conflict (Hussain, 2012).

In 2014, the Gaza War erupted again, exacerbated by Israel's Operation Protective Edge. This conflict, lasting seven weeks, resulted in thousands of casualties and severe damage in Gaza. The operation began on July 8, 2014, following the murder of three Israeli teenagers by Palestinian extremists and a retaliatory killing of a Palestinian teenager by radical Israelis. This sequence of events heightened tensions and led to increased rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel. The operation included airstrikes and a ground invasion by Israel, with the fighting continuing for 50 days. The conflict resulted in over 2,200 Palestinian deaths and 73 Israeli deaths, mostly soldiers (ADL, 2016; Sari, 2018).

In May 2021, following a series of clashes in East Jerusalem and at the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex, Hamas launched a large-scale rocket attack on Israel. Israel responded with extensive airstrikes on Gaza. The conflict lasted 11 days before a

ceasefire was achieved. Tensions were high in Jerusalem, with clashes at the Al-Aqsa Mosque and threats of eviction for Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah (ADL, 2021; Patel, 2021).

From these examples of conflict, the situation in 2023 has triggered responses from Indonesian society (Febi et al., 2024), indicating that the Hamas-Israel conflict also impacts Indonesian society, influencing various aspects including ideology and movements.

Global Impact of the Hamas-Israel Conflict in Indonesia

On October 7, 2023, after Hamas attacked southern Israel, causing 1,400 Israeli casualties, Israel retaliated by attacking Gaza (AL JAZEERA, 2023; Krisnawati, 2023). This attack had global repercussions, including the rise of propaganda by terrorist groups in Indonesia. These groups exploit any relevant issue, and this situation has been categorized by Police Commissioner Mayndra Pelaksana Tugas (Plt) Head of the Subdirectorate of Counter-Narratives at the Special Detachment (Densus) 88 of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) as an ideological crime motivated by criminal intent (SKSG UI, 2023b).

The Hamas-Israel conflict has implications for terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia, with ideological and narrative impacts. The conflict is frequently used by radical and terrorist groups in Indonesia to bolster their global jihad narrative. This event is viewed as an example of Muslims fighting oppression, which can inspire similar actions in Indonesia. Retaliation often involves jihadist terminology. Additionally, there are fundraising efforts whose destinations are unclear—whether they genuinely aid humanitarian efforts in Palestine or fund terrorist activities (SKSG UI, 2023b).

The propaganda related to the October 2023 Hamas-Israel conflict has been widely discussed on social media. Commissioner Mayndra reported that, as of October 18, 2023, there were 1,962 mentions on social media regarding news of Israel's airstrike on the Al-Ahli National Baptist Hospital in Gaza. Online media exposure peaked in October 2023, with 8,781 mentions related to various Israeli attacks and blockades of water and electricity to Palestine. The spread of such content is used for radical and terrorist propaganda. The surge in social media reporting has led to numerous solidarity actions and protests from radical and terrorist groups, and even from moderate groups. These demonstrations are often held on Fridays in major cities and remote areas, fueled by calls shared in WhatsApp, Telegram, and other social media groups, accessible to anyone. Unfortunately, these calls become gateways for radical and terrorist groups to garner public sympathy (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Further, according to Mayndra, there are organizations that have been banned in Indonesia. As part of radical movements, these groups always link any issue with the concept of the caliphate. For example, the recent conflict between Israel and Palestine, particularly the Hamas attacks in October 2023, has been used by these groups as propaganda for the caliphate issue. Neo-HTI (a group advocating for the establishment of an Islamic state) uses the Palestine issue to gain public sympathy, inflame the Hamas-Israel conflict, mobilize ideological support for destructive jihad, and promote the caliphate. For instance, in Surakarta, Solo, an action was

held by local elements and was subsequently exploited by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who openly challenged youth to go to Palestine and engage in jihad there (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Social media is indeed a very effective tool for propaganda and mobilizing mass movements. Mayndra found that 60% of the negative content on social media includes calls for jihad, support for Palestinians against Israel, boycotts of products affiliated with Israel, and demands for the government to intervene directly by deploying military forces against Israel. Conversations on social media from Indonesian users are dominated by negative and destructive narratives, posing a vulnerability as the Israel-Palestine issue, due to the Hamas attacks, becomes a provocative issue with a high potential to recruit, mobilize, and provoke people across various ideological layers to engage in violence. Thus, the Hamas-Israel war has created a cluster of issues with its own followers and has received a majority of negative responses from netizens (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Mayndra's analysis indicates that the Hamas-Israel conflict has caused polarization in society. The public is divided into two groups: one that sees the root cause of the conflict as Hamas's initial attacks on Israel, and another that views the war as a result of Israeli occupation of Palestine. This divergence in perspectives has led to provocations from various parties with vested interests in the Hamas-Israel issue. Provocative posts found on Facebook by Densus 88 police on October 9, 2023, claiming that jihad in Palestine is a mandatory duty (*fardhu 'ain*) pose a serious threat to Indonesia's security. Such provocations are also spread via TikTok, Instagram, and other social media platforms, including private and group chats (SKSG UI, 2023b).

According to Sufyan Tsauri, a deradicalization partner, a significant number of jihadists in Indonesia are spreading opinions encouraging the overthrow of the Indonesian government to enable their entry into Palestinian territory for jihad. There are also accounts affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS involved in provocation and creating narratives to label the Indonesian government as infidels, exploiting the anger of Indonesian Muslims with the aim of recruiting new members. There is serious concern about the resurgence of jihadist groups, which are currently dormant, but may use the Hamas-Israel conflict as an opportunity to mobilize. In Aceh, for example, 150 individuals suspected of being new jihadist recruits have been arrested. Recruitment efforts are taking advantage of the anger among Muslims to introduce them to jihad amid the Israel-Palestine conflict (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Indonesian Islam is characterized by high levels of solidarity and generosity, even ranking first globally in terms of charitable giving. Hamas often takes advantage of this by bringing imams to mosques during Ramadan. There have been instances where regular donations for Palestine collected by Al-Ikhwan networks in Indonesian mosques have raised concerns about whether these funds reach Palestine. Campaigns calling for donations often include statements from murabbi and jihadists in Indonesia claiming that money and property donated are used for rockets targeting Israel. Given Indonesia's high level of generosity, indirectly, Indonesian donors might be contributing to terrorism funding, which could be detrimental to the Palestinians they intend to support. Sufyan Tsauri also highlights

the more subtle actions taken by members of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Tsauri further notes that the most concerning aspect of jihadist and radical movements is their potential for revenge-driven actions. He warns against transferring the Hamas-Israel conflict onto parties or individuals who are not involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict, such as the Jewish community in Indonesia. Even Jewish followers in Indonesia continue to hide their identities due to racism. This statement is supported by Imam Subandi, a lecturer on terrorism studies at the School of Strategic and Global Studies, University of Indonesia (SKSG UI), who emphasized in a webinar that radicalism and religious sentiment have led to many victims and that the Israel-Palestine situation has created divisions, putting us in an adversarial position of Islam versus Judaism (SKSG UI, 2023b).

Groups like Salafi Jihadism aim to restore an idealized version of early Islam by emphasizing strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith, while rejecting modern interpretations and innovations. Salafi Jihadi ideology advocates for the establishment of a global Islamic state or caliphate and views violent jihad as a legitimate means to achieve this goal (Sageman, 2004).

In addition to its ideological influence, Salafi Jihadism also fosters positive perceptions and sympathy towards Hamas. Indonesia, in particular, has shown support for Hamas, praising its electoral success in 2006 and urging the international community not to judge Hamas prematurely. Public sentiment in Indonesia towards Hamas is largely positive, with a survey indicating that 61% of respondents view Hamas more favorably than other Palestinian factions (Muttaqien, 2021).

Furthermore, Salafi Jihadism promotes narratives of martyrdom and heroism, often portraying jihadis as heroic figures fighting against oppression and injustice. This romanticized view aims to recruit and motivate young Muslims to join their cause. The concept of defensive jihad against Western intervention in Muslim countries is crucial for mobilizing support (Sageman, 2004).

Salafi Jihadists continuously campaign for religious purification and unity, frequently criticizing existing Muslim governments as apostate and corrupt. This narrative justifies the need for a more intense jihad to cleanse the Muslim world and restore past glories. It also portrays Muslims as victims of global injustice, oppression, and imperialism, which legitimizes extreme retaliatory actions. Feeling like victims is pivotal in garnering support and justifying extreme measures (Sageman, 2004).

In relation to jihad as it pertains to the Palestinian issue, the Hamas Charter states, "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through jihad" (MidEast Historical Document Hamas Carter, 1988). The ideology of Hamas, which advocates for the elimination of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state throughout Palestine, remains consistent and unchanged. Hamas continues to promote the discourse of jihad and refuses to cross certain ideological red lines, even when pressured to adopt more pragmatic approaches in its daily conduct. In other words, while ideology is not the sole factor guiding Hamas's actions, it remains a crucial consideration (Litvak, 2010).

According to Litvak (2010), jihad has always received significant attention in the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin). In the context of the Brotherhood, jihad encompasses various efforts to establish Islamic law and defend Muslims from oppression (Mitchell, 1993). Hamas shares a similar view on jihad with the Brotherhood, though they implement it within different contexts. Both groups share a common definition and objective of jihad as outlined in the Hamas Charter (Hamas, 1988).

For Hamas, jihad is seen as a holy struggle to liberate the Palestinian people from Israeli occupation. This includes physical, military, political, social, and spiritual resistance to uphold and expand Islamic principles (Nesser & Nasr, 2024). Hamas explicitly supports military jihad as the primary means to combat Israel. Armed resistance is considered an integral part of legitimate jihad in defending its homeland and protecting Palestinian Muslims from Israeli aggression and occupation (Levitt, 2017). This is based on the doctrine of Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who emphasized jihad as one of the organization's core pillars. The Hamas Charter explains that jihad is an individual obligation to liberate Palestine. Thus, both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood view jihad as a tool to combat oppression and injustice faced by Muslims, believing that jihad is necessary to free Muslim land from occupation (Nesser & Nasr, 2024; Quthb, 2006).

In summary, jihad according to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood is viewed as a religious duty involving the liberation and enforcement of Islamic law, encompassing both physical and non-physical efforts, and the glorification of martyrdom. Both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood support the view that every Muslim is obligated to engage in jihad in various forms and to work collectively towards establishing an Islamic society governed by sharia.

This perspective and ideology have implications in Indonesia. As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesian Muslim solidarity is strongly influenced by the situation in Palestine. This solidarity has strengthened Indonesia's political support for Palestine on the international stage. Additionally, the conflict has had significant impacts on Indonesia's social, political, security, and foreign policy spheres, leading to various demonstrations, fundraising efforts, and humanitarian campaigns for Palestine.

For example, the demonstrations in Indonesia in May 2021 were a response to the escalation of the Hamas-Israel conflict (Dianti, 2021). In October 2023, there were protests at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and other locations across Indonesia. Thousands of demonstrators called for an end to Israeli airstrikes on Gaza amid the ongoing conflict between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas. Organized by groups such as Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia Bersatu, the protests condemned the airstrikes and criticized full American support for Israel. Other groups, like the Indonesian Confederation of Trade Unions, also joined the demonstrations, which took place in cities like Bandung, Makassar, Riau, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta (Agencies & TOI Staff, 2021; Strangio, 2023).

The conflict has strengthened solidarity among Indonesian Muslims, with Islamic-based organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah (Siregar & BBC Indonesia, 2016; The Jakarta Post, 2023), the Indonesian Ulama

Council (MUI), and student organizations participating in various campaigns against violence in Palestine and fundraising efforts (Nabalah & Bagaskara, 2024; Reflin, 2023; Sahal & Fathoni, 2017).

MUI spearheaded a large-scale demonstration at the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta, under the banner of the Indonesian People's Alliance for Palestine. Din Syamsuddin, a Muhammadiyah leader, also joined the demonstration. In addition to Muslim groups, there were also representatives from other religious organizations, including the Indonesian Bishops' Conference (KWI), the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI), the Indonesian Buddhist Union (Permabudhi), and the High Council of Confucianism in Indonesia (Matakin) (Janti, 2023).

However, the Hamas-Israel conflict also has a negative side: it can fuel solidarity sentiments towards Hamas among some Indonesian Muslims. Extremist groups exploit controversial narratives and struggles to bolster radical ideologies. They often use narratives about resisting oppression, which they claim represents the Muslim world. Some terrorist militants use this conflict as propaganda to depict global Muslim struggles against a common enemy. Radical groups use the Hamas-Israel conflict to spread propaganda and recruit members. Hamas's influence in Indonesia emphasizes Islamic terrorism activities and broader influence, including bombings often associated with groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI is seen as a center for Islamic terrorism activities related to Al-Qaeda, with some leaders being Indonesian nationals. Terrorist bombings in Indonesia have targeted foreign influence and power sites, showing a counter-hegemonic stance against non-Muslim entities (Sidel, 2018).

Radical groups also influence Indonesia's foreign policy. Radical Islamic groups advocating for Palestine affect Indonesia's foreign policy through efforts to raise awareness and support for Palestinian independence. The Palestinian issue holds significant urgency in Indonesia's foreign policy, aligning with the country's commitment to international peace and security. The involvement of radical Islamic groups in advocating for Palestine also impacts Indonesia's domestic political dynamics (Debora & Sulaiman, 2019).

Extremists use the Hamas-Israel conflict narrative to ignite jihadist fervor and promote radical views. This propaganda can increase terrorist activities in Indonesia, with the primary targets being Indonesian youth. This group is particularly vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization, leading to a heightened terrorist threat in Indonesia. The Hamas-Israel conflict is one of many conflicts in the Middle East, where Muslims are the majority. If Islam in Indonesia is perceived as aligned with Islam in the Arab world, the spectrum of threats in Indonesia grows (Bubalo & Fealy, 2007).

Radical groups exploit the suffering of the Palestinian people to incite anger and generate sympathy, which is then directed towards supporting jihad. Groups like Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) (Satria, 2024) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) (Hermansyah, 2023) are among those utilizing this narrative.

Radical Islamic groups with a hardline character tend to react strongly to global events, particularly the Hamas-Israel conflict. Their reactions can vary widely, including moral and financial support for Palestine on social media

platforms, condemnation of Israel, calls to boycott products believed to be affiliated with Israel, and even potential terrorist actions. Indonesia, as a majority-Muslim country, is highly sensitive to Israel-Palestine issues, which means that terrorist activities could occur at any time and anywhere. Although terrorism networks in Indonesia have weakened since the arrests made by Densus Anti-Terror 88 in 2018, the potential for terrorism remains a concern (Bogiarto, 2023).

This vulnerability must still be monitored because terrorist networks have adapted their recruitment and fundraising methods. They have entered the political sphere and changed their approach to new members. While they previously used hard approaches, they now prefer soft approaches, such as shifting from bullet strategies to ballot strategies. They remain active in recruitment and network development through various activities. This is evident from the 148 arrests made in 2023, predominantly involving groups like Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) (Ikhsan & Rusiana, 2023).

Another notable group is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) (Effendy, 2003), which has been banned by the government. FPI has a website and social media accounts, including on Facebook, where they spread their radical ideas, often using the issue of Palestine (Debora & Sulaiman, 2019). In addition to their ideology, FPI has implications for Indonesia's foreign policy. They not only actively support Hamas but also advocate for an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. FPI opposes Pancasila ideology as it conflicts with their goals and aspirations, focusing on Sharia law and opposing Western influence, particularly Western imperialism (Debora & Sulaiman, 2019).

FPI employs various strategies to advance anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist ideologies through the issue of Palestine. Their goal is to influence Indonesia's policies, particularly in terms of foreign affairs. FPI and other radical groups focus on mobilizing mass support to gain government positions and maintain societal influence by spreading Islamic ideology against foreign ideologies. Through activities such as public demonstrations, engagement with student organizations, and social media dissemination, these groups aim to establish an Islamic government and gather support from the military, politicians, and other layers of society. Their ultimate goal is to establish a state based on a caliphate system and implement Islamic law, posing a significant challenge to Indonesia's pluralistic and democratic values (Debora & Sulaiman, 2019).

Thus, Indonesia experiences various negative repercussions from the Israel-Palestine conflict. These include responses from different segments of Indonesian society, including government officials, religious leaders, civil society organizations, and the general public. Demonstrations, expressions of solidarity, or calls for peace initiatives may emerge in Indonesia as reactions to the Israel-Palestine conflict. This is quite reasonable given Indonesia's position in the Global Terrorism Index, which reflects concerns about terrorism, and the situation in conflict zones like Israel and Palestine can contribute to global terrorism trends that may indirectly affect Indonesia. Therefore, in addressing this issue, the Indonesian government must continuously monitor the situation closely to manage potential spillover effects from international conflicts. Diplomatic efforts, security measures, and public awareness campaigns can be crucial in managing any impacts from the

Israel-Palestine conflict. Regional and international cooperation in counter-terrorism strategies and conflict resolution mechanisms can play a significant role in mitigating the impact of global conflicts on countries like Indonesia (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022).

CONCLUSION

The Hamas-Israel conflict has significant implications for radical and terrorist Islamic groups. Even if they have not yet carried out terrorist acts, the spread of radical ideologies through recruitment and social media is increasingly uncontrollable. Therefore, youth and Generation Z are primary targets, as they are the most active users of social media. The Israel-Palestine conflict has potential effects on Indonesia due to its indirect impact on Indonesia's security and political landscape. This conflict could affect diplomatic relations, international perceptions, and potentially influence domestic sentiment among certain groups. Terrorist actions by these groups reflect the theory of relative deprivation and framing theory, evidenced by retaliation, recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising. Consequently, the government must enhance security and counter-terrorism strategies and increase public awareness.

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