DYNAMICS OF INDONESIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY FROM 1945-2021

Riezky Ruskandi Natadireja¹, Sinta Ningrum², Ramadhan Pancasilawan³
¹,²,³Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia
Email: riezky22001@mail.unpad.ac.id, sinta.ningrum@unpad.ac.id, ramadhan.pancasilawan@unpad.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Over several decades, agricultural policies have undergone changes considering societal dynamics. The development of land policy changes is divided into three periods: Landreform (1963-1965), National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN) (2007-2014), and Agrarian Reform (2017-2019). The dynamics of land policies are fundamental for shaping more inclusive and comprehensive policies in the future, as land policies encompass many aspects of social and economic life. The purpose of this research is to describe the development of land policies in Indonesia from 1945 to 2022. The research method used is qualitative with a normative legal approach, exploring principles or standards of positive law. The research findings highlight the agricultural dynamics from the period of President Sukarno to Joko Widodo, focusing significantly on Agrarian Reform, which heavily influences every natural resource.

During Sukarno’s period, initial national agrarian arrangements were made. Since Soeharto took office, the issue of Agrarian Reform nearly disappeared and was not implemented. President Habibie revived Agrarian Reform. During the leadership of Gus Dur, Megawati, and SBY, they were pioneers of reform after Habibie. During their governance, the issue of Agrarian Reform continued to strengthen, alongside the growth of food resources and attention to imported food products and farmers. During President Jokowi’s tenure, the concept of Agrarian Reform strengthened further and was demonstrated to the public, successfully enacting implementation regulations. Political considerations related to agrarian issues should at least result in legal order and harmonization of different legal systems. The political connection with national agricultural laws should ideally have beneficial effects in the future.

KEYWORDS

Growth Factor, Regeneration, Freeze – Dried Membrane, Fresh Amniotic Membrane

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International

E-ISSN: 2775-3727
Published by: https://greenpublisher.id/
INTRODUCTION

Agricultural development is an integral part of national development, holding a central role due to its foundational importance for the country's economy. This is evident from the significant number of people employed in the agricultural sector. The 2009 agricultural census showed that of Indonesia's 237 million population, around 45.3 percent worked in agriculture. The agricultural sector is highly anticipated to spur economic growth, serving as a provider or source of raw materials for industry and being a key sector for Indonesia apart from oil and gas (Statistics Indonesia, West Sumatra Province, 2010).

One effort to boost national economic growth in the agricultural sector is focusing on Agrarian Reform. Agrarian policy in Indonesia has undergone dynamics over 77 years because land has multidimensional value—economic, social, and cultural. Regulations related to land resource management are important to ensure the prudent use and maintenance of this asset in line with national and public interests.

The journey of land policy in Indonesia is based on the regulations mandated by the 1945 Constitution, Article 33, Paragraph 3. The law that emerged as land policy was Law No. 17 of 1951 concerning the Agrarian Law (AWB), which granted many land ownership rights to individuals and legal entities. The AWB was replaced by Law No. 5 of 1960 concerning the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), which substantially regulated land and natural resources (Sumardjono, 2018). The UUPA was not legally strong, with many deficiencies and gaps in its articles, leading to its reference as a sectoral law, specifically regulating land affairs. However, land law and other sectoral laws (such as irrigation, forestry, etc.) overlapped in their main tasks and functions, causing a lack of harmony and legal conflict among these laws. The Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) in 1998 formulated the plan to revise the UUPA into a Draft Land Law, agreed upon by the House of Representatives in 2013.

Agricultural policy changes are closely related to land affairs in Indonesia, as optimal land management provides maximum benefits for farmers. Throughout various governmental periods, land management has been a focus to support
agriculture in Indonesia. Agricultural policy development, particularly concerning land affairs, consists of three periods: Land Reform (1963-1965), the National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN) (2007-2014), and Agrarian Reform (2017-2019) (Sutadi et al., 2018). During the Old Order (1945-1965) period, colonial policies left a mix of Western and customary law in land policy, causing complex regulations on land use, ownership, and utilization. The implementation of Land Reform was marked by the formation of the UUPA 1960. Land institutions during the Old Order were centralized and coordinated, evidenced by Presidential Decree No. 131 of 1961 on the Land Reform Committee at central, regional, district, sub-district, and village levels. Land policy during the Land Reform era was strong, underpinned by Presidential Decree No. 263 of 1962 on the Improvement of the Land Reform Committee (Sutadi et al., 2018). Social tension arose between landless farmers and landowners when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), citing government failure in agrarian reform, unilaterally forced the program through unilateral actions.

In the New Order era, no agrarian law was issued, but partial regulations outside the law concerning agrarian matters were numerous. National Land Agency Regulation No. 3 of 1991 on the Regulation of Land Control of Land Reform Objects Independently and Law No. 15 of 1997 on Transmigration were examples of land use regulations aimed at equity and economic growth. Agrarian conflicts occurred due to the strong support for development. Problems arose from the unequal distribution of land in society. For instance, in Java and Sumatra, agrarian conflicts stemmed from changes, extensions, and transfers of land use rights managed by residents. During the Reform era, land policy was known as agrarian reform, with a focus on land redistribution as reflected in the National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN). Agrarian Reform became a national policy focus during Joko Widodo's administration, as seen through the Presidential Staff Office's National Strategy (Stranas KSP) and the 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan. In practice, obstacles such as land disputes still occur. The village government and all involved parties must coordinate to implement agrarian reform, including the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA), formed to carry out agrarian reform activities.

Although land policy development from the Old Order to the New Order has not optimally prevented existing agrarian conflicts, obstacles in agrarian reform implementation include leadership, institutional, and regulatory issues. Agrarian disputes and conflicts frequently occur in the history of land policy in Indonesia. Indonesia has numerous agrarian conflicts due to weak legal protection for agrarian laws. The dynamics of land policy are fundamental for forming more inclusive and comprehensive future policies, as land policy involves many aspects of social and economic life, such as agriculture, settlements, environment, natural resources, and nature protection. This study aims to analyze and describe the dynamics of agricultural policy from 1945-2022, covering Land Reform (1963-1965), the National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN) (2007-2014), and Agrarian Reform (2017-2019).
RESEARCH METHOD

This research employs a qualitative method with a normative legal approach, which explores the principles or standards of positive law (Marzuki, 2005). The study uses two types of literature sources: primary legal materials, which consist of binding legal regulations, and secondary legal materials, which explain the primary legal materials through literature, journal articles, and relevant research (Fajar and Yulianto Achmad, 2017). Data collection was conducted through normative legal research, gathering data from relevant legal literature. The analysis of this research is performed descriptively and qualitatively to address the research questions formulated in this study.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In each government, agricultural policies have changed in quite different ways, affecting Indonesia's agricultural growth and involvement in international organizations.

Agricultural Policy in Soekarno's Administration

After the Proclamation on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian government still faced many remnants of colonialism. This included the Dutch East Indies' debts to Indonesia and the continued operation of large multinational companies in plantations and mining. Neo-colonialism, or new colonialism, was an evolution of colonialism. The government could not create a grand agricultural plan to solve the structural legacy of colonialism due to long-standing, inviolable social relationships.

Among all Indonesian presidents, Soekarno was perhaps the quickest to understand the socioeconomic situation of farmers. The Marhaenism he introduced was inseparable from the figure of a farmer who owned means of production such as agricultural land and hoes, but whose yield was insufficient for their needs. During Soekarno's childhood, farmer poverty was a political consequence of colonial injustice. This led to young Soekarno's love for his country, driving his personality to oppose colonialism and imperialism.

Soekarno was aware that agriculture was one of the main livelihoods of the Indonesian nation. However, the fate of Indonesian farmers was far from the prosperity and comfort they hoped for, and their social status was increasingly lower compared to other workers. Soekarno declared in a very famous speech at IPB that food is the life and death of a nation and that farmers are the backbone of Indonesia's food supply, making them the pillars of the Indonesian nation. Food independence has always been a top priority for developed countries throughout history. With abundant human and natural resources, agriculture is one of Indonesia's strengths. Countries like Thailand, Vietnam, and India have shown that when their economies rely on agriculture, they can sit as equals and be respected by other countries.

Rather than changing the existing agrarian system, the government focused on developing the agricultural system. The rice production increase program began in 1945 and resumed in 1947. However, due to a lack of funds, the program could
not proceed, resulting in only a small increase in rice production. Consequently, in 1950, the Community Education Agency (BPMD) was established as an agricultural extension agency. The government had to import rice, which increased from 334,000 tons in 1950 to 800,000 tons in 1959 (Rachman, 2009). Eventually, the government created a three-year rice production plan from 1959 to 1961, aiming for food self-sufficiency by the end of 1961. To achieve this goal, the Highest Economic Operations Command (KOTOE) was formed and directly led by President Soekarno. Additionally, the Prosperity Movement Operations Command (KOGM) was formed from the central to the village level to improve agricultural facilities. Village Farming Guides (PTD) were established at the village level to help village heads achieve rice self-sufficiency (I. A. Rachman, 2009).

Moreover, the Food and Land Opening Company (BMPT) was established in 1959 to increase the availability of necessary agricultural facilities. Padi Sentra and Mekatani were two subsidiaries of this company. Padi Sentra was tasked with collecting, distributing, and providing production resources such as superior seeds, fertilizers, and medicines. Meanwhile, Mekatani aimed to mechanically develop new land, especially outside Java. With support from the Ministry of People’s Agriculture, universities were involved in extension services. Additionally, tenant farmers who joined the Rice Self-Sufficiency Implementation Organization (OPSSB) formed groups. The Padi Sentra program was considered ineffective because it only benefited landowners, particularly large landowners.

Initiatives for change from "below" began to emerge in the 1960s, especially through the participation of agricultural laborers and small farmers (Husken, 1988). Several laws governed the agrarian program, such as the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) No. 5 regulating land reform, Law No. 56 of 1960 determining the size of agricultural land, and the Sharecropping Agreement Law (UUPBH) No. 2 regulating yield (Setiawan, 2003). UUPA 1960 contained five main points:

1. In accordance with Article 33 paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution.
2. The state limits land ownership to prevent landlords from exploiting farmers through rent and pawn systems.
3. The state has the authority to issue land certificates to Indonesian citizens based on nationality principles, without gender discrimination.
4. Land must be actively worked by the farmers themselves.
5. The state provides proof of land rights to provide legal security to farmers.

Essentially, the goal of the UUPA was to transform the agricultural sector in ways that would benefit the Indonesian people. One aim of agrarian reform was to fairly distribute farmers’ living resources by quickly improving the land tenure system. The goal was to prevent land from being used for speculation and exploitation in the agricultural sector, strengthen and expand shared land ownership rights, and end unlimited land dominance and ownership with maximum limits.

To achieve fair and equitable prosperity, the Sharecropping Agreement Law was enacted to regulate the relationship between landowning farmers and tenant farmers, the size of land ownership by families, and the distribution of state land to farmers in need to increase farmer productivity. This "Land Reform Package," also known as Agrarian Reform (RA), continued the mandate of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), following the constitutional mandate of Article 33 of the
1945 Constitution. For Soekarno, land reform was "an absolute part of the Indonesian revolution" (Soekarno 1960, Salim, Widiatmoko & Suhattanto 2014, 102). Unfortunately, Soekarno did not complete this grand agenda, as land reform "collapsed" with the 1965 event, due to communist propaganda against the land reform agenda, which many consider a cause of the 1965 tragedy (Utrecht 1969, 80, Utrecht 1973, 153-154).

At the start of the UUPA's enactment, Soekarno carried out three important agendas (1960-1965): registering land, regulating the circulation of excess land according to rules, and distributing it to landless farmers, and outlining the application of the UUPA in trimming land that exceeded the rules (Utrecht 1969). Soekarno's initial work halted due to the events of 1965, which shattered all his aspirations, although he had laid the foundation for subsequent agrarian development in some fundamental ways. Many consider the 1965 event a failure of Soekarno to achieve the noble ideals of the nation's founder, land reform.

Soekarno was not without achievements; in a short time, he built strong institutions and fully implemented his ideas. After the birth of the UUPA in December 1960, Soekarno issued agricultural land size restrictions with Government Regulation No. 56 of 1960 on Determining the Size of Agricultural Land. Then, in April 1961, he formed the Land Reform Committee (Presidential Decree No. 131/1961) as the basis for managing and distributing agricultural land to priority parties, namely landless peasants and poor farmers (Government Regulation No. 224/1961, Article 8). Soekarno built land reform institutions down to the village level by forming land reform committee structures (Wiradi Gunawan, 2009). Presidential Decree No. 131 of 1961 on Land Reform Organizing Organizations (jo Presidential Decree No. 263/1964), directly led by Soekarno as the supreme commander. Articles 3 and 5-8 affirmed the Land Reform Organizing Committee structure from the central to the village level and their responsibilities. With this regulation, land reform as a government program could proceed quickly. Within a short time, Government Regulation 224 (enacted in September 1961) established the criteria for subjects, objects, compensation, and other necessary stipulations. This means that since the birth of the UUPA in September 1960, within a year, Soekarno completed all institutional arrangements for implementing land reform. By the end of 1961, Soekarno had begun to structure Indonesia's agricultural land ownership, a revolutionary dream. The key message of this implementation was that food sovereignty had to be created by first structuring agricultural land ownership so that farmers genuinely willing to farm could fulfill their roles with sufficient land and financial support, including forming cooperatives (Article 17, Government Regulation 224/1961).

However, during the same period, land reform implementation was not easy, facing much resistance and obstacles in the field. Various parties, especially landlords and those opposing Soekarno's land reform, resisted (Aidit 1964). The left-wing party (Indonesian Communist Party-PKI) provided many notes on the implementation of Soekarno's land reform, even though many references mention that communists were interested in and exploited Soekarno's land reform agenda, PKI was not without criticism of its implementation. Aidit and his colleagues issued harsh statements based on their research in West Java on Soekarno's land reform
agenda and implementation, considering it slow. Aidit's criticism became famous with the term "farmers attacking 7 village devils." This group included 1. Evil landlords, 2. Usurers, 3. Moneylenders, 4. Bureaucratic capitalists, 5. Evil middlemen, 6. Village bandits, and 7. Evil authorities, labeled by Aidit as parties obstructing land reform implementation. The NU group also criticized part of these village devils, referring to them as feudal and farmer-deceiving elites, known as "land demons."

Established in 1963/1964 to improve planning and division of labor, this intensification center functioned as a training center for KOPERTA or Agricultural Production Cooperatives, later renamed DEMAS or mass demonstration. The program was expanded fifteen times in July 1965 due to its extraordinary results. Covering 150,000 hectares across Java, its name was changed to Mass Guidance (BIMAS) on August 10, 1965 (Setiawan, 2003). The G 30 S PKI riot in September 1965 disrupted the national agricultural system, which Soekarno's government had painstakingly controlled. At that time, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the military, especially the Army, were deeply involved in political conflict. Initially, Soekarno managed to prevent the two parties from directly clashing, but the G30S PKI incident significantly changed politics. The results were as follows: First, the military and Islamic parties strengthened anti-PKI forces. Second, protests continued, leading to the Tritura demands, calling for the dissolution of the PKI, cost reductions, and the dissolution of the 100-member Dwikora cabinet. Even the Anti-Corruption Center (PKI) and its supporters collapsed (Setiawan, 2003). President's accountability report in 1967, known as Nawaksara, on the G 30 S PKI incident, was rejected by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), allowing Lieutenant General Suharto to be appointed as President of the Republic of Indonesia. This positively impacted both agriculture and Indonesia's development.

**Agricultural Policy in Suharto's Administration**

The fall of President Soekarno through a political coup marked a significant shift in agricultural policy towards capitalist populism, contrasting with the policies of the Soekarno administration. The Suharto government implemented a "new" ideology, developmentism (developmentalism), as opposed to populism (Fauzi, 1999). The BIMAS program underwent definitional changes starting in 1968/69 and was run as a collaboration between the government and foreign private companies producing agricultural drugs. This led to the emergence of various names such as BIMAS CIBA, BIMAS COOPA, BIMAS HOECHST, and BIMAS MITSUBISHI. In 1970/71, BIMAS Nasional was established, involving Bank BRI employees directly working with individual farmers. They provided kiosks for agricultural production facilities for processing and marketing their produce. Sarana Catur was later merged into a business entity called BUUD (Village Unit Business) (I. A. Rachman, 2009).

The term INMAS (Mass Intensification) emerged following increased intensification of rice crops. In 1979, INMAS was developed and implemented as INSUS (Special Intensification), INMUM (General Intensification), and INMAS with new technology. As a result, agriculture began to move towards a free market
mechanism. This became known as the Green Revolution, a global development movement aligned with economic growth. In other words, it was a capital revolution in rural areas, with massive capital inputs used to drive agricultural growth. This was supported by imports of agricultural technology products and various modern inputs. Despite rice shortages in major cities during the Soekarno administration, the Green Revolution policy succeeded. Rice imports, especially for major cities, increased from 0.3 to 1 million tons (about 10% of domestic consumption) in the early 1960s since independence. However, by the end of Soekarno's administration, imports had drastically dropped to just 0.2 million tons. The Suharto administration was acutely aware of the importance of food availability, particularly rice. Consequently, from the outset, the goal of the program was to significantly increase rice production without altering the rural social structure. This was different from land reform, which aimed to change the rural social structure through equitable land ownership.

To support this program, various village institutions were created. These included providing capital through KUT (Farm Business Credit) or Kupedes (Rural General Credit) and production tools through KUD (Village Unit Cooperatives) and BUL. These tools included enhanced agricultural technology such as the availability of tractors and huskers, agricultural production guidelines through INMAS, and sales and storage of production outputs through BUL and KUD, which were extensions of the government bureaucracy at the village level. The President directly led BULOG, which had the exclusive authority to purchase rice, wheat flour, paddy, sugar, and cooperatives. BULOG also set rice prices using fundamental pricing methods. They acted as a price stability institution and a government tool to maintain national food availability. In reality, they did not protect farmers as producers. Instead, they provided rice for distribution to the military and public staff. As a result, government procurement costs were always lower than prevailing market prices. This indicated that farmers did not profit from their yields, while BULOG reaped benefits.

Farmers did not benefit from this agricultural modernization model involving massive capital inputs. Urban residents, including businessmen, multinational companies, and importers, were the first to benefit from the import of seeds, drugs, tractors, water pumps, irrigation systems, and pesticides. Additionally, only 33% of farmers responded to modernization, primarily among wealthy and middle-class farmers, according to Suwardi's data. Similarly, in the compilation of BIMAS packages, only 38% of farmers could utilize the BIMAS and INMAS programs. KUD was more controlled by officials, farmers, traders, and other elite groups in the village, who exploited them without ordinary people's oversight (Dawam, 1984). Funding sources for the development budget heavily supported the Green Revolution program. There were two main components of state financing: international loans and grants, and revenue from oil. The Inter-Governmental Group On Indonesia (IGGI) was the donor agency group responsible for providing international loans and grants to Indonesia. Since 1968, IGGI provided far more funds annually than the total state receipts or expenditures during the Soekarno administration. However, the rise in oil prices per barrel from US$ 3 to US$ 12 in 1974, which later increased to US$ 36 in 1982 (Fauzi, 1999). After the Uruguay
Round, which took place from 1986 to 1994, Law No. 7 of 1994 established the WTO. Indonesia had to begin the liberalization process in many sectors, particularly agriculture, under the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), as outlined by the WTO. President Suharto’s ambiguity was evident in speeches at several official forums still mentioning the implementation of land reform. Similarly, the Minister of Home Affairs issued Instruction No. 11 of 1982 on Policies to Enhance Land Reform Activities, and the MPR issued Decree No. II of 1988, making the transmigration program part of land reform (Mungkasa 2014, 8). However, these efforts were merely slogans to retain the phrase "Land Reform," not to implement it as intended. Perhaps there was hesitation to implement Land Reform due to the New Order regime, which was heavily represented by the military, fostering trauma with statements that "land reform is a PKI program and land reform is a unilateral action" (Wiradi Gunawan, 2009).

Throughout the New Order’s rule, Land Reform, rooted in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution and UUPA, was nearly non-existent. Suharto then focused on the transmigration program as his flagship. In many studies, transmigration is also seen as Suharto’s version of Land Reform, but substantively, it was not Land Reform as intended by the UUPA and its derivative laws. Suharto argued that farmers, particularly in Java, needed adequate land to increase productivity, and land in Java was no longer widely available. Meanwhile, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other eastern Indonesian regions still had ample land. Since Suharto came to power, agrarian policy orientation had shifted, prioritizing land to support development policies, namely agricultural, industrial, and public infrastructure development (Salim, 2014). This resolve was realized in more concrete forms; besides building industries, Suharto also developed agriculture focused on the Green Revolution. This program became a priority alongside large-scale transmigration for Java’s population. However, behind this policy orientation shift, Suharto carried out numerous evictions and displacements in Java in the name of development (Bachriadi, 2001; Salim, 2014).

Post-Reform Agricultural Policy
Habibie Administration
The structure of New Order policies was not dismantled by subsequent administrations after the fall of Soeharto, who stepped down on May 21, 1998, due to public and student pressure amid the monetary crisis that had affected Indonesia since 1997. The monetary crisis had a significant impact on the national economy, in addition to structural problems like centralized bureaucracy and corruption. The transition of power from Vice President BJ Habibie to the President of Indonesia after Soeharto’s resignation did not bring significant progress, especially regarding food and agriculture issues. Few populist policies were made during his administration to address the crisis, and food issues became increasingly concerning. In fact, the situation worsened. Indonesia under Habibie remained similar to the previous government as the country was still subject to international institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Indonesia faced many problems, including inflation reaching 11.5 percent in 1997 and 34.22 percent in 1997/1998, a decrease in the rupiah's exchange rate to the US dollar, reaching Rp 17,000 per
US dollar in June 1998 (I. A. Rachman, 2009), soaring basic commodity prices, increasing unemployment and crime due to long-term layoffs, security instability due to social unrest in various regions, and rising international debt.

Habibie was the president who officially reinstated the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) of 1960, mentioning Land Reform in official state documents after Soeharto had "frozen" it for decades. The New Order had produced legislation that diminished and even nullified the existence of the UUPA, necessitating a review of these legal products (Sumardjono Maria SW, 2018). The result of Habibie's team led by Sumardjono culminated in the birth of MPR RI Decree No. IX 2001. Habibie is recorded in history as the first president after Soeharto's fall in 1998 to re-enforce the UUPA. He also enthusiastically embraced the idea of implementing Land Reform. By issuing Presidential Decree No. 48/1999, he demonstrated his seriousness in re-applying Land Reform policies. This initiative later resulted in the implementation of agrarian reform policies in subsequent periods.

Indonesia became the world's largest rice importer with 4.8 million tons in the 1998/1999 fiscal year, due to market expansion policies agreed upon in the WTO agreements. Due to IMF pressure since the 1998 crisis, rice import tariffs even dropped to 0%. This was the most detrimental scandal for millions of Indonesian farmers. This also applied to rice, soybeans, corn, eggs, and sugar (Setiawan, 2003). Since then, a new chapter in national violence history began.

Three components of agricultural liberalization influenced rice policy. The first was the removal of fertilizer subsidies on December 2, 1998, following the liberalization of the fertilizer economy previously monopolized by PUSRI. As a result, production costs increased, prompting the rise of HDG (Minimum Grain Price) from Rp 1,000 per kilogram to Rp 1,400 per kilogram, depending on the region. The second was the elimination of BULOG's monopoly on rice imports at the end of 1999. Now, imports could be done by anyone, removing any control. The most dangerous was the 5 percent import duty on food commodities, and even if BULOG's import monopoly was revoked, the import duty remained at 0 percent for rice (Rachman, 2009). According to Setiawan (2003), this resulted in a rapid influx of imported shallots, sugar, and rice, negatively impacting farmers.

The Habibie administration did nothing to improve the condition of Indonesian agriculture amid this uncertainty, especially regarding land disputes. These conflicts led to increased tensions between farmers and capital owners, sparking mass movements to reclaim confiscated land. One method was by making attempts to reclaim land. Eventually, the MPR rejected Habibie's accountability on October 14, 1999, resulting in many issues.

Abdurrahman Wahid Administration

When Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) and Megawati Soekarnoputri competed in the presidential and vice-presidential elections of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999, there was hope for change. During Abdurrahman Wahid's administration, the 1999-2004 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) were used to guide progress in the agricultural sector, particularly food policy. The goal of these guidelines was to build a food security system based on the diversity of food resources, institutions, and local culture to ensure the availability of food.
and nutrition in the required quantity and quality at affordable prices, while considering the improvement of farmers' and fishers' incomes and fraud prevention (Antara, 2000). However, Gus Dur's plans to build a food security system clashed with the liberalization policies agreed upon by the previous administration. Subsequently, an agreement with the IMF was made to implement a rice import duty of Rp. 430 per kg starting January 1, 2000 (later increased to a 30% tariff), but it was too late as import stocks had already filled importers' warehouses, causing domestic prices to drop (Rachman, 2009).

**Megawati Soekarnoputri Administration**

After the 1997 economic crisis, the IMF's role in determining Indonesia's economic policies became a primary focus. The Soeharto, Habibie, and Abdurrahman Wahid regimes had almost entirely handed over the government's economic policies to the IMF. Following Gus Dur's departure on July 23, 2001, Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration continued collaborating with the IMF on agricultural policy. To satisfy farmers after rice prices fell during the harvest season, the government issued Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2003 on the minimum price policy, also known as the government purchase price (HPP) reference policy for farmers. Like previous instructions, the technical requirements remained unchanged, such as a maximum moisture content of 14%, green grains at 5%, and so on. The purchase price by Perum Bulog was raised from Rp. 1,519 per kg to Rp. 1,575 per kg for rice and from Rp. 2,470 per kg to Rp. 2,750 per kg for paddy. Contrary to media reports that rice prices fell below Rp. 1,000 per kg in various places, the price policy seemed to be the only way to help farmers. However, Instruction 9/2003 did not include a system that supported achieving the HPP (I. A. Rachman, 2009).

In the government's 2003 program to address food issues, many new initiatives were introduced through policies. Despite being politically strong, the National Food Security Council was also trapped in the complexity of the sectoral bureaucratic system. The Food Security Agency under the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for this institution, resulting in very limited authority. Due to bureaucratic problems and poor coordination, Indonesia faced structural barriers to innovation and change in addressing food issues. Disagreements between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry and Trade regarding rice and sugar import regulations further highlighted differing opinions in the Cabinet and sectoral egos between the two ministries to protect their interests. Several old issues resurfaced in 2003, including increased conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural land, smuggling of staple foods at borders and official ports, food vulnerability in various regions across the country, and various agrarian disputes in government and private plantations (Antara, 2000). During the Soeharto era, Indonesia initiated the Green Revolution, which began during the New Order's development program. At that time, the Ampera Cabinet was tasked with improving people's lives, particularly in terms of food and clothing needs. Before the Green Revolution, there was a balanced food demand among rice and other food sources. However, after the Green Revolution was implemented, rice production became the main focus, neglecting other...
commodities. Under Megawati’s administration, the reduction in food supplies due to Soeharto’s policies was not as significant compared to Soeharto and SBY’s eras, indicating good food defense measures by President Megawati (Hermen Malik, 2014). The following are facts about the reduction in non-rice food supplies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Basic Food Consumption Patterns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Rice consumption reached 53%, cassava 22.26%, corn 18.9%, and potatoes 4.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Rice consumption reached 81.1%, cassava 10.2%, and corn 7.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Continued basic food consumption, corn 31%, and cassava 8.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Wheat increased nearly 500% in 30 years, while cassava and corn nearly disappeared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data shows Megawati’s success in controlling food supplies. Protecting the welfare of farmers, as promised in the 1999-2004 GBHN, was not a primary government priority compared to adhering to multilateral agreements such as the WTO. International trade policies, which typically lead to food trade liberalization, heavily influenced national policies. In 2003, the situation remained unchanged. Due to the influx of food imports from other countries without state protection, product prices continued to drop for farmers. During the five-year administrations of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, rice policy issues persisted, indicating that national food policies lacked sovereignty, leading to unclear national rice policy goals. The concept of food security was merely a vague idea in building people’s food sovereignty; even when food security was chosen as the foundation for national food development, the focus was only on food availability, not on how food could be obtained and who provided it.

During Gus Dur and Megawati’s administrations, not much progress was made in resolving agrarian issues. The most significant achievement during this period was the issuance of MPR Decree IX/2001, but not many new initiatives were born afterward. From an institutional perspective, nothing changed, and agrarian reform policies did not develop. Agrarian conflicts in regions intensified, with no new breakthroughs from land agencies. Gus Dur, as president, focused more on international relations and saving the economy from the 1998 crisis. After Timor-Timor’s separation, Papua experienced unrest, and Gus Dur focused on these situations.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Administration

On October 20, 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla were inaugurated as president and vice president for the 2004-2009 period after winning the second round of the presidential and vice-presidential elections. Indonesia's food problems remained unchanged from previous administrations during the SBY-JK administration. The SBY-JK government still tended to follow old practices from the New Order era, such as relying on aid, debt, and foreign investment, and using the Green Revolution as an alternative to agrarian reform to
address food issues. The Agricultural, Fisheries, and Forestry Revitalization Program (RPPK) proposed by the SBY administration lacked clear objectives.

The government continued to focus on food security rather than food sovereignty. As a result, food issues were always addressed by meeting national food needs rather than building a strong and independent national food system. Therefore, during the SBY administration, import policies were still implemented. Seventy percent of the state budget was used to pay off foreign debt. Additionally, SBY-JK issued policies supporting the continuity of international capital to cover the necessary financing for the government sector, indicating that the SBY-JK administration was still subject to international capital. The government sometimes used repression against citizens who disagreed with the policies made, such as policies tailored to international capital. In fact, SBY’s agricultural revitalization program focused only on production and did not address the more important issue of the availability of cheap quality food. Access aspects were very vulnerable to rising fuel prices. Fuel compensation in the form of direct cash assistance did not automatically solve this problem.

Global warming and climate change, caused by the conversion of food to energy triggered by rising oil prices, led to a decline in food production worldwide. Wheat production in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Russia decreased from 622 million tons in 2005 to 593 million tons in 2007. This caused prices to rise from 4.52 USD per bushel in 2006 to 9.93 USD per bushel in 2007 (Rachman, 2009). Besides external factors, internal factors also played a role in food shortages, caused by an increase in agricultural land from 110 thousand hectares in 2002 to 145 thousand hectares in 2006. This was due to a decline in the productivity of the agricultural sector, which in 1997 was 1.7 million while the productivity of the industrial sector reached 9.5 million (1:5.58). However, in 2005, the productivity of the agricultural sector was 6.1 million, and the productivity of the industrial sector was 41.1 million (1:6.73), indicating that the agricultural sector was becoming less attractive (Azahari, 2008).

Agrarian Reform (RA) under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) regime, led by Joyo Winoto, aimed to redistribute 8-9 million hectares of land sourced from forest areas, HGU (land use rights), abandoned lands, and other former rights lands. However, in practice, it failed because the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Agriculture withdrew their support, and SBY could not control it. The RA issue began to be seriously considered five years after the issuance of TAP MPR IX/2001 when the National Land Agency was headed by Joyo Winoto. Before the end of SBY’s term, an important moment was created by the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (AMAN), the Customary Law Community Union of Kenegerian Kuntu, Kampar Regency, Riau Province, and the Customary Law Community Union of Kasepuhan Cisitu, Lebak Regency, Banten Province, supported by scholar activists and NGOs. In March 2012, this group officially filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court (MK) against Law No. 41 of 1999, which greatly harmed the community, especially indigenous peoples (Siscawati, 2014).

By the end of SBY's second term, the National Land Agency (BPN) focused more on land administration issues. Asset legalization policies continued, and land redistribution to the poor further diminished. Additionally, land-based development
policies strengthened. After the enactment of Law No. 2/2012 on Land Acquisition, SBY's focus increasingly shifted towards development projects with sufficient efforts to resolve agrarian conflicts partially. Hendarman continued Joyo Winoto's tradition of asset legalization and conflict resolution through one of his deputyships. However, once again, conflict resolution efforts failed to address the widespread agrarian conflicts in the regions caused by "policy neglect" from previous periods (Widyanto, 2013; Mulyani, 2014).

**Joko Widodo Administration**

Over the years, Agrarian Reform (RA) has undergone many changes and interpretations regarding its practices in terms of types, content, objectives, and functions. These adaptations correspond to the development of the countries that implement it and the times they are in. According to Sukarno, in his speeches before the enactment of the UUPA, "implementing Land Reform is an absolute part of the Indonesian revolution." Indonesia itself has once wanted an ideal RA, which means the establishment of a fair power structure that is revolutionary (Salim, 2014). Agrarian conflicts and increasing land tenure inequalities had to be addressed at the beginning of Joko Widodo's administration. These latter two problems were integral components of agrarian issues. Once elected president, Joko Widodo-JK changed the nomenclature of BPN to a ministry to address agrarian institutional issues. Until now, there has often been a debate about agrarian institutions, which must handle many issues but only at the level of the head of the agency. Because "his clothes have been raised", Joko Widodo responded to the demands of many parties to give more freedom to the Ministry of ATR/BPN. After becoming a ministry, ATR/BPN is no longer seen as inferior to other land-handling ministries, especially the Ministry of Forestry and the Environment.

Jokowi-JK's closeness to the people who happened to come from the ordinary community brought a very profitable spiritual atmosphere, because they gained public confidence from many groups. It is shown by high expectations from various parties to new leaders who have just been installed. However, Jokowi's rise in Indonesia's "mourning" atmosphere, as fire disaster everywhere occurs, so the ruler's priority is how to quickly stop the fire and manage its impact on society. And in fact, until the first semester of 2015, government energy was focused on resolving these issues. President Jokowi-JK took several concrete steps to prevent larger fires, including imposing moratoriums on new permits in primary forests and peatlands, and also establishing the Peat Restoration Agency (BRG) in January 2016 (Presidential Regulation No. 1 of 2016) to rescue Indonesian peatlands (Wijaya, et al., 2016). The Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government said in Nawacita, "Nawacita is simply translated as being politically sovereign, economically independent, and culturally personalized, as the spirit and implementation of Agrarian Reform" (Presidential Staff Office, 2017, 14). This priority agenda, as indicated by number one, focuses on national recovery, agenda number 3 focuses on Indonesian development from the edge, and agenda number 5 focuses on improving community welfare by encouraging agrarian reform and land ownership programs covering an area of 9 million hectares. Furthermore, this agenda is
included in the National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2015-2019 Book I, 81).

Because there are no responsible parties, from the legal to the responsible institutional level to implement it, the above-mentioned priority agenda does not immediately become a policy program. The Presidential Staff Office, led by Teten Masduki and Noer Fauzi Rachman, then started several RA priority plans. The Presidential Staff then made this agenda, including planning the legal instruments and institutional structures. At the beginning of 2016, the president began to make a draft of Agrarian Reform with the help of the Presidential Chief of Staff. This preparation was made to help inter-sector cooperation to overcome agrarian issues. Kastaf completed the RA design to be launched soon by the President in April and June 2016. On August 24, 2016, Joko Widodo launched the Agrarian Reform program in the Limited Cabinet Meeting. Joko Widodo realizes the impact of the launch and is committed to making it happen. Sectoral factors have been shown to thwart RA during the previous period. Therefore, Joko Widodo had to overcome the obstacles of sectoral ego in each ministry (Presidential Office, 2017).

To successfully run Agrarian Reform, the country needs two Perpres, namely Perpres No. 88 of 2017 concerning the Completion of Land Domination in Forest Areas (PPTKH) and Perpres No. 86 of 2018 concerning Agrarian Reform. Nevertheless, because of budget limitations, the state cannot form institutions (GTRA) as regulated in Perpres 88/2018 up to the district level; it only applies at the provincial level. Although the progress made by the Joko Widodo-JK regime has gradually become quite clear, it appears that there is a slowdown in its implementation. This is because not everyone can accept something new, so the road to RA is still far from hope until the end of 2018. However, it is hoped that GTRA from the province to the district will encourage RA in the field, including resolving agrarian conflicts that are still ongoing in several areas. However, the agenda for implementing RA in each ministry has not been stopped by the lack of GTRA at the district level. The Ministry of ATR/BPN continues to redistribute land from non-forest and ex-forest areas. The legalization of community assets as part of the RA scheme is still ongoing, with minimal progress (Secretary-General of ATR/BPN, 2019), because asset legalization is an important initiative that serves as one way to regulate land ownership and control in Indonesia and a strategy to arrange Agrarian Reform. Inventory and field verification programs for PPTKH and Social Forestry are still ongoing at KLHK. This means that the Joko Widodo-JK RA program is still running, even though its institution is incomplete. However, many people in the region do not expect its acceleration. The Joko Widodo-JK Agrarian Reform program, only two years old, has not yet answered many real problems and community needs. It only meets some basic community needs.

In addition, land redistribution of 4.5 million hectares to date (2017-2018) is still far from the set target (Secretary-General of ATR/BPN, 2019). Justice and welfare as the core of the problem are still far from what should happen, but the road to it is actually much clearer and easier to see. However, in reality, it is always difficult to implement due to the problems that occur at the lower level. One thing that starts to be questioned is the performance of the PPTKH and GTRA Inver Teams in the area, which is considered not meeting the expectations of the central
government. From here we can understand that agrarian conflict reached 2,291 cases during the Joko Widodo period from 2015 to 2020. This is more than 2000 cases in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The plantation sector has contributed most of the cases, so it is not surprising if agricultural land or plantations that are still productive overlap in the process of plantation HGU in some places. At the end of 2021, Joko Widodo stated that he did not want agrarian conflict to continue while giving land certificates to the community, which were part of agrarian reform.

The Joko Widodo government is committed to strengthening fair land law. In addition, he relied on land for life. According to Joko Widodo, agrarian conflict is a very difficult issue for land cultivators. Joko Widodo himself did not want this agrarian conflict to continue, because for forty years this conflict has not been resolved. Many parties have tried to reach an agreement to resolve it, but this conflict has increased. To accelerate the development of the capital and resolve land in Indonesia, Joko Widodo ordered the Minister of ATR and BPN to continue collaborating with leaders and heads of agencies through meetings. In terms of community needs, Operational Cooperation (KSO) is the topic of discussion in these meetings. not just about demands, but also about collaborating on these issues and how to resolve them. With this agrarian reform, Joko Widodo is expected to consistently resolve agrarian conflicts and community fulfillment rights by launching continuous laws. Every initiative of Joko Widodo requires community participation for counseling and socialization, which is greatly needed to support the community. In addition, Joko Widodo asked the apparatus to act firmly against land mafias so that the community did not hesitate about their existence to protect the rights and laws related to the land mafia that were increasingly severe.

Local government tasks to resolve disputes, especially those related to land. As part of the conciliation effort, meetings were held between the contending parties that took place to end the dispute. Mediation resulted in an agreement agreed by the community that they would not allow an extension of business rights over property claimed by the community until the community dispute had been definitively resolved. There are two ways to resolve problems related to this property: first, using courts to resolve them; or second, alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Head of the National Land Agency of the Republic of Indonesia Regulation Number 3 of 2011 concerning the Assessment of Land Management and Handling uses the National Land Agency to carry out its functions. This non-departmental agency is responsible for helping resolve land disputes. In the event of a dispute between two (two) parties implementing a dispute resolution procedure, in accordance with the regulations, the National Land Agency may act as a mediator. The decision of the National Land Agency of the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 2007 is the one that caused the problem. Technical Instructions No. 05/JUKNIS/D.V/2007, which regulates the mediation implementation mechanism, must be maintained and updated. In addition, in accordance with Technical Instructions 06/JUKNIS/D.V/2007 on Cases in Court and Follow-Up to Court Decisions. In terms of judicial proceedings to resolve disputes, the National Land Agency is authorized to carry out its functions.
Discussion
Landreform (1963-1965)
Landreform or often referred to as Agrarian Reform (RA) as a concept and a grand idea carries a mission that is not simple. Landreform exists as a manifestation of Law No. 5 of 1960 concerning the Basic Agrarian Principles (known as UUPA), which embodies the constitutional mandate of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. Since its inception (after the birth of UUPA), the implementation of the Agrarian Reform agenda has always experienced ups and downs and changes according to the interests and policies of the ruling regime. Initially, the spirit of implementing Landreform was very strong, as Sukarno in his political speech before the UUPA was ratified on August 17, 1960, firmly and strongly declared that "land reform is the aspiration of the Indonesian revolution, a revolution without land reform is like a building without a foundation, a tree without a trunk, grandiloquence without substance, like a quack selling medicine." For Sukarno, the implementation of Landreform was "an absolute part of the Indonesian revolution" (Salim, 2014). Unfortunately, Sukarno did not have the opportunity to complete this major agenda; Landreform collapsed with the events of 1965, as a result of communist propaganda against the Landreform agenda, which many parties cited as one of the causes of the tragedy of the 1965 events ((Utrecht, 1969; Utrecht, 1973).

Habibie was the president who reaffirmed the enforcement of UUPA/1960 by mentioning Landreform in the country's official documents, after Soeharto "suppressed" it for decades. That statement later gave birth to Presidential Decree No. 49 of 1999 instructing Minister Muladi to form a team to study UUPA in relation to other legal products. The results of this study recommended that the government review laws related to natural resource management, and the team led by Maria SW Sumardjono recommended that the government "review the legislation related to agrarian resource management/natural resources produced by the New Order government together with Soeharto, and that the state resolve legal overlaps related to UUPA." According to the team, the New Order had produced legislation that diminished or even nullified the existence of UUPA, so the existence of several legal products needed to be reviewed (Sumardjono Maria SW, 2018).

Afterwards, the Landreform campaign did not stop; in fact, it gained momentum because it received public support. And what was produced by Habibie's team under the leadership of Sumardjono finally led to the birth of TAP MPR RI No. IX 2001. During Habibie's term of office, Presidential Decree No. 48/1999 was issued as a form of his seriousness in re-implementing Landreform policy. What was initiated subsequently gave birth to the practice of RA policy in subsequent periods.

National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN) (2007-2014)
The symposium held by the Head of the National Land Agency under Joyo Winoto gave birth to a policy later known as the National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN), and later popularly known as Agrarian Reform (Sohibuddin, Salim 2013, 9). The failure to implement RA 9 million hectares with the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Agriculture was a heavy blow to Joyo Winoto, who had carefully planned the agenda. Joyo seriously prepared PPAN, including addressing the
challenges of Tap MPR IX/2001 as the legal basis for RA. Joyo initiated the RA Presidential Regulation to be submitted to President SBY. However, SBY failed to issue the Presidential Regulation that had long been conceived by Joyo Winoto and his team. This failure became a serious problem for Joyo Winoto because there was no adequate legal framework for him to implement PPAN, including no legal basis for forming RA institutions, even though in the draft Presidential Regulation it included institutions to manage RA. In SBY's hands, it was much worse than Sukarno's era; RA wilted before it developed, RA was extinguished before it was implemented, and Joyo Winoto was "alone" struggling to redistribute land from available objects, former HGU and abandoned land. Unfortunately, the potential object of RA from the quite significant abandoned land failed to materialize, because the majority of abandoned land determinations to be used as RA objects lost in their trials in court, only in Batang was successfully won by the National Land Agency, others majority of BPN were defeated.

After the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture resigned and was not involved in the processes of RA policy formation, Joyo Winoto continued to introduce RA issues to the public with bureaucratic support (BPN). Joyo Winoto consciously did not side with the right because the bureaucratic machine was not fully believed or trusted and was able to move RA, therefore efforts to seek support from other parties became important, one of which was scholar activists and NGOs who had a concentration of RA issues (N. F. Rachman, 2017). Joyo Winoto then popularized the concept of RA with a new term, assets + access inspired by Hernando de Soto. He campaigned that "Agrarian reform is land reform within the framework of constitutional, political, and legal mandates to achieve justice in Land Ownership, Ownership, Usage, and Utilization (P4T) plus access reform" (Winoto 2007, 777), which he developed from de Soto's ideas (Soto Hernando de, 2001).

Joyo Winoto believed that the concept developed by Hernando de Soto could attract the interest of many parties to give more attention, and it turned out that de Soto's concept was sufficiently addressed by SBY, and then invited him to an official cabinet meeting to present his ideas. In essence, assets + access is about how to move assets owned by the community so that they can move first by being given a title (certificate) to be able to be moved to capital access, one of which is to the bank. With the title or certificate, the community has the opportunity to move their assets to the market by injecting capital to be useful. Soto believes that the poor in various parts of the world are not because they do not have assets, but because they have multiple assets, but are not effective.

According to Soto, this reality occurs in many poor countries, even in Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America, the total value of assets of the poor is 150 times greater than all foreign investments that have entered the country since independence from France in 1804 (Soto Hernando de, 2001). So, Soto believes as also believed by Joyo Winoto, poverty occurs because of the ineffectiveness of assets and systems that work in the field. Soto's concept was then popularized by Joyo Winoto, and the mass land certification program increased dramatically during his tenure. However, Soto's efforts represented a new chapter by involving the community in the market economic scheme (Soto 2001, 31-32).

Joyo Winoto's program with a simple concept and not too new but succeeded
in attracting public interest, and received support from the World Bank as evidenced by the old scheme Land Management and Policy Development Program–LMPDP (2004-2009) continued with a focus on land management and certification. Because with more certification, people will be able to move land into the market by accessing capital. Meanwhile, redistribution was not much done because the land objects were not widely obtained, so actually Joyo Winoto's program focus was the most significant which was asset legalization (I. A. Rachman, 2009) and land redistribution was experiencing stagnation. In other words, what Joyo Winoto imagined about Landreform plus or RA (assets + access) at the beginning of his leadership that would be carried out by re-arranging land ownership was actually more to serve the will of the World Bank, namely shifting RA with asset legalization which finally formed the land market in Indonesia (N. F. Rachman, 2017).

Agrarian Reform (2017-2019)

President Joko Widodo at the beginning of his term with Jusuf Kalla defined agrarian reform more succinctly, encompassing re-regulation through laws or overhaul of land tenure systems with plans for redistribution based on land ownership rights (N. F. Rachman, 2017; Wiradi Gunawan, 2009). Agrarian conflicts and increasing land tenure disparities had to be addressed early in Joko Widodo's administration. Since the launch of the President's Agrarian Reform program in August 2016, Kastaf has focused on refining the program design and inter-ministerial coordination to align with the president's vision, mission, and spirit regarding agrarian reform.

During this period, comprehensive discussions were also held on the institutional forms that would manage agrarian reform, such as the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) and the Agrarian Reform Authority (BORA). The Presidential Regulation on Agrarian Reform eventually included one of these proposals (Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 86 of 2018), namely the Agrarian Reform Task Force, directly led by the Coordinating Minister for the Economy. Overall, the book "Merah Putih" Implementation of Agrarian Reform, Presidential Staff Office Guidance: National Priority for Agrarian Reform in the Government Work Plan for 2017, issued by the President's Staff Office, has assisted in formulating the Agrarian Reform Program (Office & President, 2017). This book serves as a guideline for implementing the Social Forestry Program (PS) by the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla Government. In addition, in this document, the definition of agrarian reform was expanded for the first time to include forest utilization permits as individual, collective, or communal rights schemes (Office & President, 2017).

With the concept of community forestry, Social Forestry is a legal product that has existed since November 2016 (Ministerial Regulation No. P.83/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/10/2016). During the previous period, Social Forestry had been implemented through various approaches (Muhsi, 2017), but during the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla era, it became a primary focus within agrarian reform, due to the access and assets necessary to support community economic independence. Consequently, in the "Merah Putih" book, PS is officially referred to as a policy program to be campaigned by the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government to obtain permits for utilizing land covering an area of 12.7 million hectares. PS:
KLHK 2015–2019 Strategic Plan already includes this.

The Presidential Chief of Staff's guidance book on agrarian reform translates Presidential Regulation No. 45 of 2016 concerning the Government Work Plan for 2017. The Government Work Plan for 2017 stipulates that the implementation of agrarian reform must be a national priority program. Therefore, the Chief of Staff's guidance book is considered a "reference for the implementation of agrarian reform that covers goals, as follows: providing tenure certainty for communities whose land is embroiled in agrarian conflicts, identifying recipients and land objects to be redistributed their ownership relationships, addressing land tenure disparities by redistributing and legalizing lands from Agrarian Reform Objects (TORA) (President's Staff Office 2017, 6). "Strengthening Regulation and Resolving Agrarian Conflicts; 2. Arranging TORA Ownership and Possession; 3. Legal Certainty and Legalization of Rights to TORA; 4. Community Empowerment; and 5. Institutional Implementation of Agrarian Reform" are the five main agendas of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla. Subsequently, GTRA and other sector ministries gradually addressed these agendas (Office & President, 2017).

Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla progressively implemented the above five main agendas. After each sector understood their tasks and responsibilities, including preparing internal regulatory frameworks for ATR/BPN, KLHK, and other related ministries, regulations binding all sectors were then created. First, Presidential Regulation No. 88 of 2017 concerning Settlement of Land Tenure in Forest Areas (PPTKH), issued in September 2017, took a significant step towards resolving longstanding issues of community land within forest areas that could be used as objects of agrarian reform (TORA). In May 2018, Ministerial Regulation No. 3 of 2017 was subsequently issued as its operational rule. To resolve disputes and land tenure issues in forest areas, this Presidential Regulation and the Ministerial Decision utilized field inventory and verification mechanisms. Second, Presidential Decision on Agrarian Reform Number 86 of 2018 was only enforced in early 2019. This President made the decision to form an organization to oversee the execution of agrarian reform.

Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla's Agrarian Reform Program, which was only two years old, had not yet addressed many real issues and community needs. It only fulfilled some basic community needs. Moreover, land redistribution covering 4.5 million hectares up to now (2017-2018) is still far from the target set (Secretary General of ATR/BPN, 2019). Justice and prosperity as the core issues are still far from what should happen, but the path to get there is actually much clearer and easier to see. However, in reality, it is always difficult to implement because the problems that occur at the grassroots level are very difficult to resolve. One thing that is starting to be questioned is the performance of the PPTKH Inventory Team and GTRA in the regions, which is considered not meeting the expectations of the central government. From here, we can understand that agrarian conflicts reached 2,291 cases during the term of President Joko Widodo from 2015 to 2020. This is more than 2,000 cases during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) term. The plantation sector contributed the majority of cases, so it is not surprising that agricultural or plantation lands that are still productive overlap in the plantation business process (HGU) in several places. At the end of 2021, Joko Widodo stated
that he did not want agrarian conflicts to continue while granting land certificates to communities as part of agrarian reform. The Joko Widodo government is committed to strengthening fair land laws. In addition, he relies on land for life.

CONCLUSION

In the early post-independence period of Indonesia, Sukarno laid the groundwork for national agrarian management through laws, emergency decrees (Perpu), government regulations (PP), presidential decrees (Keppres), and other regulations. However, unfortunately, the events of 1965 shattered his plans before they could be implemented. During Soeharto's presidency, agrarian reform (RA) issues were nearly non-existent; Sukarno's Agrarian Law was frozen, and RA was not pursued. New hope emerged with the rise of Habibie. He attempted to reintroduce the Agrarian Law and the concept of RA by forming the Landreform team. However, due to Habibie's short tenure, he did not institutionalize RA as an official state policy after the end of Soeharto's authoritarian rule. Gus Dur, Megawati, and SBY were successors to the reform after Habibie. During their administrations, RA issues continued to gain strength, and the state provided sufficient space for the public to demand RA. It was during this period that the concept of RA truly developed, and RA practices were initiated.

After the MPR IX Decree of 2001 set a turning point for the reinstatement of RA implementation in Indonesia, SBY began implementing RA programs. However, its implementation was challenging, and RA progress during the SBY period stalled and may have failed. Before the end of SBY's presidency, RA issues decreased as public expectations of the government declined.

Finally, Jokowi reintroduced the concept of RA to the public domain and successfully enacted RA implementation regulations, a legal product previously unresolved by SBY. Institutionally, he successfully built arguments for RA implementation by creating several models. Although not new ideas, legalizing assets to build a database of ownership and strengthening people's rights, social forestry rights, and forest area RA were successfully implemented programs that garnered public support. However, Jokowi's efforts to integrate forest utilization permits with asset distribution did face several obstacles and failed to achieve the expected goals, particularly in redistributing assets from lands released from forest areas.

Through research findings, it is concluded that the agricultural dynamics from the period of President Sukarno to Joko Widodo highlighted the issue of Agrarian Reform, where every natural resource was greatly influenced by this issue. During Sukarno's period, the initial national agrarian management was established through laws, emergency decrees (Perpu), government regulations (PP), presidential decrees (Keppres), and other regulations. Since Soeharto took office, the issue of Agrarian Reform nearly disappeared; Sukarno's Agrarian Law was frozen, and RA was not implemented. President Habibie attempted to restart this Agrarian Reform but did not complete it. During the leadership of Gus Dur, Megawati, and SBY, they were predecessors to the reform after Habibie. During their governance, the issue of RA continued to strengthen, and food resources also grew, with imported food products and farmers beginning to be observed during this period, and the state
providing sufficient space for society to demand RA. During President Jokowi’s tenure, the concept of RA strengthened further and was demonstrated to the public, successfully enacting RA implementation regulations.

The relationship between the state, politics, and law in the agrarian environment is depicted by Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which states that "The land, water, and natural wealth contained therein" are "owned by the state and shall be used for the greatest prosperity of the people." This also indicates that natural resources such as land, water, and the minerals found therein are the basis of human wealth. This means that they must be under state control and used for public purposes. At the very least, policies related to agrarian issues should result in legal stability and the harmonization of various legal systems. Over time, the political connection with national agricultural laws should be beneficial. This means that legal development must be continuous and avoid many interpretations or even various functions, especially in the field of agrarian law. National agricultural legislation that emphasizes "the greatest prosperity of the people" should support each other. With political intent, the creation of laws must prioritize the interests of the community as a whole rather than the interests of small groups or factions.

REFERENCES


PERATURAN PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA NOMOR 86 TAHUN 2018. TENTANG REFORMA AGRARIA.


